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Dave Owen* 
Abstract. Groundwater is one of the world’s most important natural resources, and its 
importance will increase as climate change continues and the human population grows. 
But groundwater management has traditionally been governed by lax and uneven legal 
regimes. To the extent those regimes exist, they tend to focus on the extraction of 
groundwater rather than the processes—referred to as groundwater recharge—through 
which water enters the subsurface. Yet groundwater recharge is crucially important to the 
maintenance of groundwater supplies, and it is also highly susceptible to human 
influences, particularly through our pervasive manipulation of land uses. 
This Article discusses the underdeveloped law of groundwater recharge. It explains why 
groundwater-recharge law, or the lack thereof, is important; it discusses existing legal 
doctrines that affect groundwater recharge, occasionally by design but usually 
inadvertently; and it explains how more intentional and effective systems of 
groundwater-recharge law can be constructed. It also sets forth criteria for judging when 
regulation of groundwater recharge will make sense, and it argues that a communitarian 
ethic, rather than the currently prevalent laissez-faire approaches, should underpin those 
regulatory approaches. Finally, it suggests using regulatory fees as a key (but not exclusive) 
instrument of groundwater-recharge regulation. 
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Introduction 
Every day, around the world, billions of people rely on water pumped 
from wells.1 They do so because groundwater is an extraordinarily useful 
resource. It is available over broad areas; even in landscapes where surface-
water streams are few and far between, many people can access groundwater 
simply by drilling a well.2 Because some contaminants filter out as water 
moves through the subsurface, groundwater is often cleaner than surface 
water.3 And because groundwater usually flows slowly and evaporates only 
minimally,4 groundwater storage can often last much longer than surface-
water storage; groundwater therefore can remain available even during 
extended droughts. These benefits extend to ecological systems as well as 
human extractive users.5 Because groundwater tends to be cleaner, cooler, and 
more steadily available than surface runoff, it plays a crucial role in sustaining 
many rivers, streams, wetlands, and lakes.6 
 
 1. For statistics, see Facts About Global Groundwater Usage, NAT’L GROUND WATER ASS’N, 
https://perma.cc/PAH9-EWWZ (archived Mar. 8, 2021). In 2015, the U.S. Geological 
Survey estimated that 115 million people in the United States alone rely on 
groundwater for drinking water. The Quality of the Nation’s Groundwater, U.S. 
GEOLOGICAL SURV. (Jan. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/9HHD-8AGP; see also Mark 
Giordano, Global Groundwater? Issues and Solutions, 34 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RES. 153, 154 
(2009). Giordano explains: 
There is no question that the use of groundwater has brought astounding benefits to literally 
billions of people. Probably the majority of the world’s cities rely to some degree on 
groundwater for urban water supply, and it could be argued that groundwater in part enabled 
the global urbanization phenomena we are now witnessing. No less spectacularly, large-scale 
agricultural groundwater use has brought massive benefits to legions of small, poor (or 
previously poor) farmers, particularly in Asia. 
  Id. 
 2. See Giordano, supra note 1, at 155. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See id; Peter Dillon & Muhammad Arshad, Managed Aquifer Recharge in Integrated Water 
Resource Management, in INTEGRATED GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS, 
APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES 435, 445 (Anthony J. Jakeman et al. eds., 2016) (describing 
losses as high as 35% to 45% of stored surface water due to evaporation). But see E. 
Balugani et al., Groundwater and Unsaturated Zone Evaporation and Transpiration in a 
Semi-arid Open Woodland, 547 J. HYDROLOGY 54, 54-55 (2017) (noting that the low-
evaporation assumption, though common, is probably incorrect and can lead to 
overestimation of recharge). 
 5. See Derek Eamus et al., Groundwater Dependent Ecosystems: Classification, Identification 
Techniques and Threats, in INTEGRATED GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT, supra note 4, at 
313, 317-18 (describing types of groundwater-dependent ecosystems). 
 6. See generally Masaki Hayashi & Donald O. Rosenberry, Effects of Groundwater Exchange 
on the Hydrology and Ecology of Surface Waters, 43 J. GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY 327, 
330-31 (2001) (describing flow patterns and temperature effects); S.D. Keesstra et al., Soil 
as a Filter for Groundwater Quality, 4 CURRENT OP. ENV’T SUSTAINABILITY 507 (2012) 
(describing the filtration function of soils and variables affecting pollutant filtering). 
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Despite its value, groundwater is often ignored, misunderstood, or taken 
for granted, and inattention often goes hand in hand with unsustainable 
exploitation.7 Consequently, groundwater supplies in the United States and 
around the world are being depleted, in some places with alarming speed.8 
That depletion is already leading to shortages, which are likely to spread and 
intensify as a growing global population uses more water and as climate 
change accelerates water stress.9 The human costs of these crises can be 
immense.10 So, too, are the environmental consequences; many surface 
waterways would not flow, and some have already ceased flowing, without 
inflows from groundwater.11 
Yet even as groundwater resources come under growing strain, many 
people are eyeing groundwater as an increasingly important source of future 
supply.12 Their reasons are straightforward: We must get water from 
somewhere, and in a warming world, with more droughts and less water 
precipitating as snow, less surface water will be available in many places, 
particularly during warmer and dryer seasons.13 Water managers might 
compensate for increasingly erratic flows by building more dams and surface 
reservoirs, but in many areas, few good dam sites remain.14 Dam construction 
and operation are also expensive and environmentally destructive, and much 
 
 7. See Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253, 255 (2013). 
 8. See M. Rodell et al., Emerging Trends in Global Freshwater Availability, 557 NATURE 651, 
655 (2018) (describing accelerating drawdown in California’s Central Valley); Steven 
M. Gorelick & Chunmiao Zheng, Introduction to a Special Edition, Global Change and 
the Groundwater Management Challenge, 51 WATER RES. RSCH. 3031, 3031 (2015); J.S. 
Famiglietti, Commentary, The Global Groundwater Crisis, 4 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 
945, 946 (2014). 
 9. See Blanca E. Jiménez Cisneros & Taikan Oki, Freshwater Resources, in 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY; PART A: GLOBAL AND SECTORAL ASPECTS 229, 241 
(Field et al. eds., 2014), https://perma.cc/2JNQ-A8LS (describing projections of 
increased irrigation demand due to population and economic growth, as well as climate 
change). 
 10. See Owen, supra note 7, at 305 n.319 (citing sources describing how groundwater 
shortages contribute to human conflicts, including the civil war in Syria). 
 11. See THOMAS C. WINTER ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., CIRCULAR 1139, GROUND 
WATER AND SURFACE WATER: A SINGLE RESOURCE 8-10 (reprt. 1999) (explaining 
interconnections between groundwater and surface flows); Famiglietti, supra note 8, at 
947 (“Many of the world’s largest rivers, for example, the Colorado, Indus, Murray and 
Yellow rivers, no longer reach the ocean, because of excessive water use and 
overallocation, including overpumping of groundwater.”). 
 12. See Richard G. Taylor et al., Ground Water and Climate Change, 3 NATURE CLIMATE 
CHANGE 322, 324 (2013) (describing projected increases in demand for groundwater). 
 13. See Timothy R. Green et al., Beneath the Surface of Global Change: Impacts of Climate 
Change on Groundwater, 405 J. HYDROLOGY 532, 539-40 (2011). 
 14. See Christine A. Klein, On Dams and Democracy, 78 OR. L. REV. 641, 697 & n.371 (1999). 
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of the water stored behind dams evaporates before it can be used.15 Turning to 
groundwater—which often can be stored for longer periods, with lower 
evaporation losses and with less environmental impact—seems like an 
appealing alternative.16 
These water-supply crises and opportunities are intertwined with legal 
challenges. The challenges arise partly from the physical nature of 
groundwater. Because groundwater moves in response to pumping, wells in 
one area can drain water from beneath neighboring lands,17 generating 
conflicts between neighbors. At broader scales, groundwater’s tendency to flow 
across property lines makes it a common-pool resource and creates the 
potential for a classic tragedy of the commons.18 Some combination of 
property rights and regulatory governance is a standard response to such 
potential tragedies, and consequently, groundwater extraction is governed by 
common law water rights, legislation, and administrative regulations.19 These 
systems are often underdeveloped;20 even in the United States, regulation of 
groundwater pumping has lagged behind regulation of surface-water use, and 
groundwater laws often provide spotty and ineffective coverage.21 
Nevertheless, for groundwater pumping, the overall trend is toward more 
pervasive and sophisticated regulation.22 
 
 15. See COMM. ON SUSTAINABLE UNDERGROUND STORAGE OF RECOVERABLE WATER, NAT’L 
RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PROSPECTS FOR MANAGED UNDERGROUND 
STORAGE OF RECOVERABLE WATER 13-15 (2008). 
 16. See id. at 15. 
 17. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 107 (1990) (“Water underlying any parcel of land . . . can be siphoned 
to a neighbor’s land . . . .”). 
 18. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Essay, Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the 
Commons, 30 ENV’T L. 241, 246, 250 (2000) (“[G]roundwater is . . . a natural commons.”). 
 19. See generally Owen, supra note 7, at 266-71 (describing groundwater law). 
 20. See Famiglietti, supra note 8, at 946 (“[G]roundwater is often poorly monitored and 
managed. In the developing world, oversight is often non-existent.”); Barton H. 
Thompson, Jr., Beyond Connections: Pursuing Multidimensional Conjunctive Management, 
47 IDAHO L. REV. 273, 274 (2011) (describing “lax legal rules and poor enforcement”). 
 21. See Owen, supra note 7, at 266-71. 
 22. See id. at 268-69; see also, e.g., Tina Cannon Leahy, Desperate Times Call for Sensible 
Measures: The Making of the California Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 9 
GOLDEN GATE U. ENV’T L. REV. 5, 8-11 (2015) (chronicling the emergence of statewide 
groundwater-use regulation in California). 
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Source: M.W. Toews, Conceptual Diagram of Near-Surface Hydrology (2007), 
https://perma.cc/96T9-6ELN. 
As shown in the Figure above, however, pumping groundwater out of the 
ground is only one part of the groundwater cycle. Before groundwater is 
available to pump, it needs to get into the ground, which happens through a 
process known as groundwater recharge.23 Groundwater recharge involves 
water infiltrating through the ground surface, percolating downward through 
unsaturated soil or rock, and then hitting the water table—that is, the level 
below which the pore spaces in subsurface soil or rock are filled with water 
rather than air.24 
Despite its crucial role in water cycles, groundwater recharge has not 
received much legal attention.25 There are obvious reasons why groundwater 
23. See WINTER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3. 
24. See C.W. FETTER, APPLIED HYDROGEOLOGY 5 (4th ed. 2001). This description assumes
that the water percolates to a shallow, unconfined aquifer. Where confining layers—
which are subsurface layers that limit water flow—exist, recharge processes are more
complicated. See Aquifers and Groundwater, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://perma.cc/
3VP7-SQHV (archived Mar. 8, 2021). 
25. See Thompson, supra note 20, at 301 (“States also historically ignored the important
connection between land use and land cover, on the one hand, and groundwater
footnote continued on next page 
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recharge is not a noticeable process; we usually do not see water’s subterranean 
movements, and most people don’t ponder where water goes when the ground 
surface dries up.26 Additionally, recharge is a natural, gravity-driven process. 
In many places, water does not need legal assistance to move downward. 
Nevertheless, the locations and rates at which recharge occurs are heavily 
affected by pervasive human manipulation of the ground surface, and those 
human manipulations in turn are partially determined by law. 
Human impacts on groundwater recharge take a variety of forms. Over 
much of the earth’s land surface, humans determine what vegetation grows, 
and increasing the amount of water consumed by plants typically means 
reducing infiltration deeper into the ground.27 People also decide where roads, 
buildings, and other impervious surfaces are constructed, and impervious 
surfaces control whether precipitation flows over or through the ground 
surface.28 We move massive quantities of irrigation water, and some excess 
irrigation water becomes recharge.29 Our often-antiquated systems for 
delivering water—for both agricultural and urban use—leak into the ground.30 
We constrain the movements of surface water, building levees that limit 
flooding and, therefore, limit the infiltration of surface water into areas 
adjacent to rivers and streams.31 All of these manipulations of the land surface 
and the water cycle are at least partly the products of property rights, planning 
processes, permits, subsidies, and other regulatory decisionmaking, which 
 
recharge and quality, on the other.”). The attention recharge does receive generally 
focuses on managed aquifer recharge (MAR), which usually involves diverting water 
from a river or stream during high-flow periods and injecting it into aquifers. I discuss 
managed aquifer recharge in more depth in Part II.D below. 
 26. This is true of groundwater more generally. See Daniel L. Dickerson et al., Groundwater 
in Science Education, 18 J. SCI. TCHR. EDUC. 45, 46 (2006) (noting that students and science 
educators alike generally don’t know much about groundwater). 
 27. See Vildan Sahin & Michael J. Hall, The Effects of Afforestation and Deforestation on Water 
Yields, 178 J. HYDROLOGY 293, 303-04 (1996) (finding that increasing forest cover 
generally reduces water yields); cf. Bernt Matheussen et al., Effects of Land Cover Change 
on Streamflow in the Interior Columbia River Basin (USA and Canada), 14 HYDROLOGICAL 
PROCESSES 867, 868 (2000) (“Removal of forest cover is known to increase streamflow as 
a result of reduced evapotranspiration and to increase peak flows as a result of higher 
water tables.”). 
 28. See Emily S. Bernhardt & Margaret A. Palmer, Restoring Streams in an Urbanizing World, 
52 FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 738, 739-40 (2007). 
 29. See Bridget R. Scanlon et al., Impact of Land Use and Land Cover Change on Groundwater 
Recharge and Quality in the Southwestern US, 11 GLOB. CHANGE BIOLOGY 1577, 1586 (2005) 
(finding much higher recharge rates in irrigated areas). 
 30. David Schaper, As Infrastructure Crumbles, Trillions of Gallons of Water Lost, NPR  
(Oct. 29, 2014, 6:06 PM ET), https://perma.cc/23NQ-3FBK. 
 31. See Jeffrey J. Opperman et al., Sustainable Floodplains Through Large-Scale Reconnection to 
Rivers, 326 SCIENCE 1487, 1488 (2009) (identifying groundwater recharge as a benefit of 
floodplains). 
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means that groundwater recharge is partially determined by law. Yet law’s 
effects on groundwater recharge have received little attention from 
policymakers and academic researchers. 
This Article begins to fill that gap, addressing the United States’ laws at the 
intersection of land use and groundwater recharge. It begins, in Part I, with a 
primer on how groundwater recharge works and how humans influence 
groundwater-recharge processes. Part I also explains why attention to 
groundwater recharge has become increasingly important and how climate 
change is likely to further increase that importance in years to come. Part II 
then turns to traditional legal doctrines governing the quantity of 
groundwater recharge.32 It describes a hodgepodge of doctrines, many of which 
affect recharge without any underlying plan or design, and none of which 
seem matched for an era in which water managers increasingly call for 
carefully planned uses of groundwater. 
Part III considers the future of groundwater-recharge law. More 
specifically, it turns to three basic questions that legal regimes for groundwater 
recharge must address. The first question is whether more robust regulation of 
groundwater recharge makes sense at all. In some places, the answer to that 
question will be yes, while in others, those systems would be more trouble than 
they are worth. Part III offers criteria for judging which is which. The second 
question is what sort of ethic should underpin a system of groundwater-
recharge law. Any system of natural-resource regulation (or nonregulation) 
reflects judgments, often implicit, about our appropriate relationships with the 
natural world and with each other. Part III exposes the laissez-faire judgments 
inherent in existing law and explains how a more communitarian ethic would 
provide a foundation for better legal regimes. The third and final question is 
what regulatory instruments a more robust system of groundwater-recharge 
law should employ. There are many possibilities: Property-based regimes, 
informational regulation, planning, performance standards, prohibitions, and 
 
 32. Laws protecting groundwater from recharged pollution are more extensive than laws 
governing the amount of groundwater supply. Hazardous-waste laws like both the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act are designed partly to keep pollutants out 
of groundwater. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
580, 90 Stat. 2975 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 
94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 33, and 42 U.S.C.). The 
Clean Water Act does so as well, though only in circumstances where discharges to 
surface water through groundwater are the “functional equivalent” of direct discharges 
to surface water. See County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468 (2020). 
Some states also have laws or regulations designed to protect aquifers from 
contaminated recharge. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-354g to -354p (2021) 
(providing a program to protect aquifers from contamination); MD. CODE  
REGS. 26.08.02.09 (2021) (requiring state approval of discharges into aquifers). 
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financial incentives all might have roles to play. But Part III suggests particular 
attention to mechanisms that use impact fees to encourage better groundwater 
management and to create pools of money to support selective governmental 
interventions. 
In some ways, answering these questions requires delving into the unique 
science and policy of an often-ignored hydrologic process. But in other ways, 
groundwater-recharge regulation presents a microcosm of problems that recur 
all along the frontiers of environmental and natural-resource law. 
Groundwater-recharge law remains underdeveloped partly because of data 
gaps and limited understanding, and similar limits and gaps challenge many 
areas of environmental and natural-resource regulation.33 Groundwater-
recharge problems often arise from the cumulative effects of many individual 
landowners’ actions, rather than from a few readily identified and easily 
targeted actors.34 This, too, creates challenges that often arise both within and 
beyond the environmental field.35 Finally, groundwater-recharge management 
can create difficult tradeoffs among different policy goals, and the challenge of 
managing difficult tradeoffs again helps define environmental and natural-
resource law.36 Although every regulatory challenge is unique in some ways, 
these commonalities mean that a study of groundwater recharge can draw 
lessons from, and shed light upon, regulatory challenges that cut across the 
environmental field. 
I. Groundwater Recharge and the Water Cycle 
Groundwater is crucially important to humans and to natural systems. But 
it can fulfill that importance only if it somehow gets into the aquifers from 
which it is later pumped or from which it discharges into surface waterways. 
In many places, much of that infiltration occurred millennia ago;37 some 
presently arid regions have large aquifers that formed from the melting of ice-
age glaciers or during times when the climate was much wetter than it is 
today.38 But in many areas, at least some of the water people pump from the 
 
 33. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
 35. See Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms, 64 FLA L. 
REV. 141, 143-44 (2012). 
 36. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit 
Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1653 (2001) (listing examples of unintended 
tradeoffs created by risk regulation). 
 37. See Scott Jasechko et al., Global Aquifers Dominated by Fossil Groundwaters but Wells 
Vulnerable to Modern Contamination, 10 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 425, 426 (2017). 
 38. See, e.g., Jane Braxton Little, The Ogallala Aquifer: Saving a Vital U.S. Water Source, SCI. 
AM. (Mar. 1, 2009), https://perma.cc/V5H9-NY7J; Bridget R. Scanlon et al., Global 
footnote continued on next page 
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ground was above the ground surface not so long ago, and it infiltrated 
through processes whose unabated continuation is by no means assured. This 
Part explains the pathways that water follows as it reaches subsurface aquifers 
and the many ways in which human activity can impede or accelerate 
movement along those paths. 
A. Natural Water Cycles 
Imagine, for a moment, a rainstorm falling onto a forest. Particularly in 
summer, when leaves are out, the forest canopy will intercept some of that 
rain.39 Of the rain that does reach the ground surface, some will evaporate, and, 
if the rainstorm is large or the ground is already saturated, some will flow 
laterally over the ground surface, perhaps continuing to flow until it reaches 
wetlands or streams.40 Water that does not evaporate or flow overland will 
continue its downward journey and will percolate through layers of leaves and 
duff and into the soil.41 Along the way, much of it will be taken up by plants’ 
root systems, particularly during growing seasons, and some will linger as soil 
moisture in the unsaturated zone.42 Water that is in excess of plants’ needs, or 
that root systems cannot intercept, will percolate further down, moving 
through pore spaces—and, in bedrock, through networks of fractures—until it 
reaches the water table.43 
In other natural landscapes, similar processes occur, though the amount 
and locations of infiltration can be different. In desert landscapes, water 
movement through moisture-starved soils may be limited, and almost all 
precipitation evaporates or is transpired.44 Consequently, over much of an arid 
 
Synthesis of Groundwater Recharge in Semiarid and Arid Regions, 20 HYDROLOGICAL 
PROCESSES 3335, 3349-50 (2006) (describing the origins of aquifers beneath the Sahara 
Desert). 
 39. See COMM. ON REDUCING STORMWATER DISCHARGE CONTRIBUTIONS TO WATER 
POLLUTION, NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., URBAN STORMWATER 
MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 131 (2009), https://perma.cc/NT4D-TBXQ. 
 40. FETTER, supra note 24, at 37-39. 
 41. See id. at 38-39. 
 42. See id. at 28-30; see Unsaturated Flow Basics, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://perma.cc/
WY64-A2MD (last updated Jan. 2013). 
 43. See FETTER, supra note 24, at 94; Aquifer Basics: Igneous and Metamorphic-Rock Aquifers, 
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://perma.cc/HZT2-RGD9 (last updated Dec. 28, 2016) 
(describing water movement through secondary porosity). These processes are more 
complicated where confining layers—which are layers of impermeable subsurface 
material, like clay or nonporous bedrock—constrain the vertical movement of water. 
See supra note 24. 
 44. See E.G. Jobbágy et al., Water Subsidies from Mountains to Deserts: Their Role in Sustaining 
Groundwater-Fed Oases in a Sandy Landscape, 21 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 678, 679 
(2011) (noting the absence of recharge in most arid landscapes). 
Law, Land Use, and Groundwater Recharge 
73 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (2021) 
1173 
landscape, little groundwater recharge will occur.45 But where surface runoff 
concentrates in ephemeral streams or wetlands, substantial volumes of water 
can percolate down to the water table.46 Concentrated recharge also may occur 
where streams emerge from mountain ranges and enter valleys filled with sand 
and boulders, much like water that disappears after it is poured from a bucket 
onto a sandy beach.47 Over time, these processes can accumulate huge volumes 
of groundwater, even in areas where the ground surface usually looks bone 
dry.48 
As these examples illustrate, recharge occurs differently across different 
landscape types. Recharge rates also tend to be heterogeneous across smaller 
spatial distances, across seasons, and across different types of precipitation 
events. Several factors drive that heterogeneity. One factor is vegetation’s 
demand for water.49 That demand can vary significantly within and between 
landscape types.50 It also can vary seasonally, particularly in temperate 
landscapes where winter halts most plant growth.51 A second key factor is the 
permeability of soil and bedrock, which also can be heterogeneous across small 
spatial scales.52 A third key factor is the duration and intensity of storms.53 
Brief, low-intensity storms may do little more than wet the ground surface and 
will often produce little infiltration.54 Higher-intensity rainstorms can 
 
 45. See id. 
 46. See Jacobus J. de Vries & Ian Simmers, Groundwater Recharge: An Overview of Processes 
and Challenges, 10 HYDROGEOLOGY J. 5, 8 (2002) (describing focused-recharge zones in 
desert landscapes—but also noting that alluvial soils and riparian vegetation can 
impede recharge); Warren W. Wood et al., Quantifying Macropore Recharge: Examples 
from a Semi-arid Area, 35 GROUNDWATER 1097, 1098 (1997) (describing recharge 
through cracks in the clay in playa basins). 
 47. See FETTER, supra note 24, at 291-93. 
 48. See, e.g., Jobbágy et al., supra note 44, at 689 (describing substantial contributions from 
mountains to recharge in adjacent arid plains). 
 49. See, e.g., Scanlon et al., supra note 38, at 3350-51 (describing substantial recharge 
increases in nonvegetated and de-vegetated areas). 
 50. See, e.g., W.R. Dripps & K.R. Bradbury, The Spatial and Temporal Variability of 
Groundwater Recharge in a Forested Basin in Northern Wisconsin, 24 HYDROLOGICAL 
PROCESSES 383, 386-90 (2009). 
 51. See Scott Jasechko et al., The Pronounced Seasonality of Global Groundwater Recharge, 50 
WATER RES. RSCH. 8845, 8846 (2014) (describing seasonal variation and its causes). 
 52. See Andreas Hartmann et al., Enhanced Groundwater Recharge Rates and Altered Recharge 
Sensitivity to Climate Variability Through Subsurface Heterogeneity, 114 PNAS 2842, 2842 
(2017) (“Subsurface heterogeneity notably affects groundwater recharge . . . .”). 
 53. See Arik M. Tashie et al., Identifying Long-Term Empirical Relationships Between Storm 
Characteristics and Episodic Groundwater Recharge, 52 WATER RES. RSCH. 21, 22 (2016). 
 54. See id. (“For infiltration to occur, precipitation must first exceed interception by the 
vegetation canopy. Subsequently, for infiltration to contribute to recharge, the soil 
must be wetted enough to allow vertical drainage below the root zone . . . .”). 
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produce more infiltration,55 but they also may deliver that precipitation faster 
than the ground can absorb it, which means a lower percentage of the storm’s 
precipitation will infiltrate into the ground.56 In short, in many landscapes, 
levels of recharge can vary significantly over both space and time. 
B. Human Influences 
In a variety of ways, humans affect these processes of groundwater 
recharge. Indeed, each of the key variables described above is highly susceptible 
to human influence. And that influence is pervasive. Leaving aside the driest 
desert areas, where little precipitation occurs anyway,57 and tundra and taiga 
regions, humans have developed, farmed, grazed, deforested, or reforested most 
of the earth’s terrestrial landscapes.58 Groundwater recharge therefore has 
entered what some scientists call the Anthropocene Epoch, when 
environmental processes are rarely free of human influence.59 
The most obvious way in which humans manipulate groundwater 
recharge is through the development of land surfaces. Human development 
usually brings impervious surfaces—typically roofs and pavement—to 
landscapes where vegetation and soils previously were present.60 These 
impervious surfaces block recharge, and in urban landscapes, stormwater tends 
to flow over the ground surface rather than entering the ground.61 At modest 
levels of precipitation and modest levels of urbanization, these changes might 
not alter recharge levels much. Gravity is persistent, and stormwater that 
would have infiltrated on one parcel may simply flow to the next parcel and 
infiltrate there. But as urbanization levels increase or as storms become 
larger—or both—flows intercepted by impervious surfaces may overwhelm 
the capacity of the pervious areas that remain.62 A common consequence is 
flooding, and most cities therefore build networks of storm drains that convey 
 
 55. See id. (summarizing studies finding that in some landscapes, most recharge occurs 
during heavy-storm events). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Because of imported irrigation water or fossil aquifers, even highly arid areas may be 
farmed and thus may be sites for groundwater recharge. 
 58. Andrew P. Jacobson et al., Global Areas of Low Human Impact (“Low Impact Areas”) and 
Fragmentation of the Natural World, SCI. REPS., Oct. 2, 2019, at 1, 3 & fig.1, 4 & fig.2; Roger 
LeB. Hooke et al., Land Transformation by Humans: A Review, GSA TODAY, Dec. 2012, at 
4, 6 (showing summary data). 
 59. See Colin N. Waters et al., The Anthropocene Is Functionally and Stratigraphically Distinct 
from the Holocene, 351 SCIENCE 137, 138 (2016). 
 60. See Bernhardt & Palmer, supra note 28, at 738-40. 
 61. See id. at 740. 
 62. See Shiqiang Du et al., Quantifying the Impact of Impervious Surface Location on Flood Peak 
Discharge in Urban Areas, 76 NAT. HAZARDS 1457, 1458 (2015). 
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surface flows directly into waterways, bypassing the aquifers through which 
much of the stormwater would otherwise pass.63 These stormwater flows 
create major pollution problems, for urban stormwater gathers cocktails of 
pollutants as it passes over the ground surface.64 The interruption of 
infiltration also can reduce aquifer recharge, sometimes significantly.65 
Humans also influence recharge by managing vegetation.66 Farming is one 
obvious example. Anywhere people introduce crops, they affect recharge 
levels, and whether they are increasing or decreasing those levels depends 
upon whether the crops demand more water than the vegetation they replace, 
whether a plowed or otherwise manipulated ground surface is more or less 
porous than a native landscape, and whether the farmers irrigate their plants.67 
Logging has similar effects.68 Introduction of non-native species, either as 
cultivated plants or as unwanted invaders, also can affect recharge.69 And even 
in landscapes that might appear natural, human choices have profound effects 
 
 63. See Dave Owen, Urbanization, Water Quality, and the Regulated Landscape, 82 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 431, 441 (2011). 
 64. See id. at 441-42. 
 65. See Chester L. Arnold, Jr. & C. James Gibbons, Impervious Surface Coverage: The 
Emergence of a Key Environmental Indicator, 62 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 243, 244-45 (1996). But 
see Dongmei Han et al., Alterations to Groundwater Recharge Due to Anthropogenic 
Landscape Change, 554 J. HYDROLOGY 545, 549 (2017) (noting that impervious surfaces 
can also increase recharge by concentrating surface flows). Other changes associated 
with urbanization—particularly reductions in vegetation levels, increases in imported 
irrigation water, and leaking pipes—can offset the impacts of impervious surfaces, and 
in urban areas that don’t rely on groundwater pumping, the loss of recharge caused by 
impervious surfaces may not be problematic (it may even prevent problematically 
high groundwater levels). See generally John M. Sharp, Jr., The Impacts of Urbanization on 
Groundwater Systems and Recharge, AQUA MUNDI, June 2010, at 53-55 (describing the 
variety of ways in which urbanization can promote as well as inhibit recharge). But if 
an urban area does rely on groundwater pumping, or could do so, this lost recharge can 
be a significant problem. 
 66. See Tashie et al., supra note 53, at 21 (“[M]any studies have found large increases in 
average annual recharge by the conversion of forests and shrubs to crops and  
grasses . . . .”). This relationship does not always exist, however. See id. at 22 (noting 
other studies that found that deforestation reduced recharge levels). 
 67. See Han et al., supra note 65, at 546; Scanlon et al., supra note 38, at 3350-52 (providing 
examples). 
 68. See U. Ilstedt et al., Intermediate Tree Cover Can Maximize Groundwater Recharge in the 
Seasonally Dry Tropics, SCI. REPS., Feb. 24, 2016, at 1, 1 (describing the “dominant 
paradigm” that forest cover decreases groundwater recharge). 
 69. See, e.g., NATURE CONSERVANCY & WATER FUNDS FOR AFR., THE GREATER CAPE TOWN 
WATER FUND: ASSESSING THE RETURN ON INVESTMENT FOR ECOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
RESTORATION 8, 19-22 (2019), https://perma.cc/Y6TB-Z8D5 (describing invasive-species 
impacts in the Cape Town area, which recently experienced massive drought); 
Kimberly Burnett et al., Economic Lessons from Control Efforts for an Invasive Species: 
Miconia calvescens in Hawaii, 13 J. FOREST ECON. 151, 158 (2007) (describing an invasive 
species that could cause massive recharge depletion in Hawaii). 
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on vegetation levels and therefore on groundwater recharge. The United 
States’ forests, for example, have been heavily affected by fire-management 
practices, not just in the modern Smokey Bear era of fire suppression but also 
during the precolonial era, when Native American tribes used fire to produce 
better landscapes in which to gather and hunt.70 Such fire-management 
practices influence the amount of vegetation present in forests and, therefore, 
the balance of transpiration and recharge.71 
Human decisions also affect the places where large volumes of water 
gather, and therefore where concentrated infiltration occurs. This happens in 
several ways. Developers and farmers drain or fill streams and wetlands, thus 
forcing water onto other parts of the landscape, where infiltration may occur 
to different extents.72 Through their attempts to control floods, engineers 
often limit streams and rivers to narrow paths, isolating them from floodplains 
that might otherwise serve as infiltration zones.73 Pipes leak, often heavily, and 
that leaked water becomes groundwater.74 Local governments also must 
 
 70. See Scott L. Stephens & Neil G. Sugihara, Fire Management and Policy Since European 
Settlement, in FIRE IN CALIFORNIA’S ECOSYSTEMS 431, 431-34 (Neil G. Sugihara et al. eds., 
2006). 
 71. See generally Bharat Sharma Acharya et al., Woody Plant Encroachment Impacts on 
Groundwater Recharge: A Review, WATER, Oct. 17, 2018, at 1 (describing the varying 
influences of forest composition upon groundwater recharge); M.L. Wine & D. Cadol, 
Hydrologic Effects of Large Southwestern USA Wildfires Significantly Increase Regional 
Water Supply: Fact or Fiction?, ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS, Aug. 18, 2016, at 1 (concluding that 
the answer is fact, for two of the three studied watersheds); Alicia M. Kinoshita & Terri 
S. Hogue, Increased Dry Season Water Yield in Burned Watersheds in Southern California, 
ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS, Jan. 5, 2015, at 1, 7-8. 
 72. See, e.g., Lisa A. McCauley et al., Land Use and Wetland Drainage Affect Water Levels and 
Dynamics of Remaining Wetlands, ECOSPHERE, June 2015, at 1, 10 (describing connections 
between wetland filling, groundwater recharge, and flooding). While these 
relationships exist, in some places they may not matter to regional-scale groundwater 
storage. See Garth van der Kamp & Masaki Hayashi, The Groundwater Recharge Function 
of Small Wetlands in the Semi-arid Northern Prairies, 8 GREAT PLAINS RSCH. 39, 49-50 
(1998) (finding that wetland draining may lower local water tables but have minimal 
impact on regional aquifers). 
 73. See OFF. OF RSCH. & DEV., U.S. EPA, EPA/600/R-14/475F, CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS & 
WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF THE SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 3-11 to -12 (2015), https://perma.cc/PG52-QAML. 
 74. See Han et al., supra note 65, at 548. The authors explain: 
If water supply to a newly urbanized area is sourced from outside the immediate catchment 
and is distributed by a pressurized mains network, this creates a new potential source of 
recharge, via pipeline leakages. Such inter-basin water transfer associated with urban 
development can have huge impacts on water balances and lead to enhanced recharge and 
rising water tables. 
  Id. (citations omitted); see also, e.g., B. Garcia-Fresca, Urban-Enhanced Groundwater 
Recharge: Review and Case Study of Austin, Texas, USA, in URBAN GROUNDWATER: 
MEETING THE CHALLENGE 3, 7-8, 13-14 (Ken W.F. Howard ed., 2007). 
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choose between disposing of wastewater through septic systems, which can be 
significant pollution sources but also provide recharge, or through 
consolidated wastewater-treatment systems, which often bypass aquifers and 
release waters directly to surface waterways.75 Perhaps most importantly, 
farmers deliberately introduce additional water to millions of acres of irrigated 
land.76 Crops absorb some of this water, and some evaporates, but much of it 
infiltrates beneath fields or through leaky irrigation ditches.77 
In addition to altering the earth’s surface, humans also affect recharge by 
manipulating air temperatures and the amount and timing of rain and snow. At 
subglobal scales, people most often do this through large-scale landscape changes 
like deforestation.78 Generally, removing forests reduces evapotranspiration, 
which then reduces atmospheric moisture in downwind areas, which in turn 
decreases precipitation and recharge in those same areas.79 Conversely, adding 
irrigated areas can increase downwind precipitation and recharge.80 The extent 
 
 75. See, e.g., Millicent Lawton, Tapped Out, COMMONWEALTH MAG. (Dec. 1, 2000), 
https://perma.cc/7PG6-2UYT (describing how removing wastewater has depleted 
local supplies in eastern Massachusetts). See generally S.S.D. Foster & P.J. Chilton, 
Downstream of Downtown: Urban Wastewater as Groundwater Recharge, 12 
HYDROGEOLOGY J. 115, 115 (2004) (noting that urban wastewater is both a major 
pollution problem and an important resource). 
 76. See Guoyong Leng et al., A Modeling Study of Irrigation Effects on Global Surface Water 
and Groundwater Resources Under a Changing Climate, 7 J. ADVANCES MODELING EARTH 
SYS. 1285, 1285 (2015) (“[A]round 70% of global freshwater in 2000 was withdrawn for 
irrigation, which accounted for 90% of consumptive water use.”). 
 77. Stephen Foster et al., Impact of Irrigated Agriculture on Groundwater-Recharge Salinity: A 
Major Sustainability Concern in Semi-arid Regions, 26 HYDROGEOLOGY J. 2781, 2781 
(2018) (“Where flood irrigation techniques with surface water are practiced on 
permeable soils, they are a major source of groundwater recharge and often the 
predominant one in arid terrains.”). 
 78. See generally R.A. Pielke Sr. et al., An Overview of Regional Land-Use and Land-Cover 
Impacts on Rainfall, 59 TELLUS 587, 588-91, 593, 595 (2007) (describing a variety of 
temperature effects in a variety of landscape types). 
 79. See Meine van Noordwijk et al., Climate-Forest-Water-People Relations: Seven System 
Delineations, in FOREST AND WATER ON A CHANGING PLANET: VULNERABILITY, 
ADAPTATION AND GOVERNANCE OPPORTUNITIES; A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT 27, 35-
37 (Irena F. Creed & Meine van Noordwijk eds., 2018). 
 80. See Ahmed M. Degu & Faisal Hossain, Investigating the Mesoscale Impact of Artificial 
Reservoirs on Frequency of Rain During Growing Season, WATER RES. RSCH., May 5, 2012, 
at 1, 11-14 (finding evidence of increased atmospheric moisture downwind of dams, 
though primarily in Mediterranean climates); Anthony DeAngelis et al., Evidence of 
Enhanced Precipitation Due to Irrigation over the Great Plains of the United States, J. 
GEOPHYSICAL RSCH., Aug. 14, 2010, at 1, 2, 12 (summarizing prior research and finding 
evidence consistent with increased precipitation downwind of areas irrigated from the 
Ogallala Aquifer). 
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of these effects varies substantially, however, with factors like temperature and 
wind speed playing significant roles.81 
An even more significant influence comes from anthropogenic climate 
change.82 Climate change is warming the world, and that warming changes 
evapotranspiration levels, shrinks glaciers and winter snowpacks, and 
generates more intense storms and more frequent droughts.83 These changes 
are making groundwater an increasingly appealing resource and thus are 
raising the importance of groundwater recharge.84 But at the same time, these 
changes will affect the amount of recharge that occurs and the places where it 
happens, not always in consistent or predictable ways.85 In some locations, 
reduced precipitation and warming-driven increases in evapotranspiration 
will combine to decrease recharge, sometimes dramatically.86 Some locations 
are likely to see increases in precipitation, which may bring associated 
recharge increases.87 And in some areas, a wide range of outcomes is possible.88 
 
 81. See van Noordwijk et al., supra note 79, at 36 (describing pronounced effects in tropical 
areas with low wind speeds). 
 82. Because deforestation is a major driver of climate change, and because climate change 
threatens the viability of some forests, subglobal and global climate-related changes to 
recharge are interrelated. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 45 fig.1.5 (2015), https://perma.cc/J69G-
38W4 (showing the relative influence of forestry and other land-use changes and of 
fossil-fuel combustion); John T. Abatzoglou & A. Park Williams, Impact of 
Anthropogenic Climate Change on Wildfire Across Western US Forests, 113 PNAS 11770, 
11772 (2016) (estimating the “near doubling of forested burned area” attributable to 
anthropogenic climate change). See generally Wen-Ying Wu et al., Divergent Effects of 
Climate Change on Future Groundwater Availability in Key Mid-latitude Aquifers, NATURE 
COMMC’NS, July 24, 2020, at 1, 1-2 (explaining why different aquifers will be subject to 
different effects). 
 83. See Jiménez Cisneros & Oki, supra note 9, at 235-36. 
 84. See Green et al., supra note 13, at 539-40. 
 85. See Tashie et al., supra note 53, at 21 (“[T]he influence of these [climate-]altered 
precipitation characteristics on groundwater recharge is complex and remains poorly 
understood.”). 
 86. See Thomas Meixner et al., Implications of Projected Climate Change for Groundwater 
Recharge in the Western United States, 534 J. HYDROLOGY 124, 132-35 (2016) (describing 
projected recharge decreases in several aquifers); Bjørn Kløve et al., Climate Change 
Impacts on Groundwater and Dependent Ecosystems, 518 J. HYDROLOGY 250, 250 (2014) 
(“The predicted climate change will exacerbate these concerns in many parts of the 
world by reducing precipitation and increasing evapotranspiration, both of which will 
reduce recharge . . . .”). 
 87. See Meixner et al., supra note 86, at 135 (“[T]he wet areas will get wetter and the dry 
areas will get drier.”). 
 88. See Gene‐Hua Crystal Ng et al., Probabilistic Analysis of the Effects of Climate Change on 
Groundwater Recharge, WATER RES. RSCH., July 2010, at 1, 16-17 (describing a range of 
scenarios for the High Plains). 
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C. Regulatory Challenges 
In summary, human activity pervasively affects groundwater recharge, 
and recharge is crucially important to people in many ways. Accordingly, one 
key point of this Article is that laws should address these interactions between 
groundwater recharge and human decisions. But the complex realities of 
groundwater management create three recurring challenges for any system of 
groundwater law. This Part closes by explaining those difficulties. 
Importantly, none of these challenges are unique to groundwater-recharge 
regulation; informational deficits, policy tradeoffs, and cumulative effects are 
the classic challenges of environmental and natural-resource law, and these 
issues arise in many other regulatory fields.89 But each challenge arises with 
particular force in this realm. 
First, complexities, data gaps, and uncertainties abound. Even at aggregate 
levels, the effects of recharge-altering practices can be difficult to measure. For 
example, while general relationships between urbanization and water cycles 
are well documented, scientists are still trying to understand many aspects of 
the movement of water through urban areas.90 Additionally, developing a 
conceptual and aggregate understanding is quite different from understanding 
recharge effects at a parcel-by-parcel level—which might be important if law is 
to assign responsibilities or accord benefits to individual landowners. 
Similarly, effects of forest and fire management on recharge can be 
complicated and variable over time. Further complicating matters, offsetting 
effects often occur together. For example, in urban landscapes, imported water 
and reductions in vegetation can increase recharge, while impervious surfaces 
decrease recharge.91 Sorting out the net effect of these changes can be difficult 
(and that net effect can vary from place to place). 
Second, tradeoffs are pervasive. As may be obvious from the examples cited 
so far, desirable groundwater recharge sometimes derives from otherwise 
 
 89. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 35, at 143-44 (describing the pervasiveness of cumulative-
effects problems); Holly Doremus, Data Gaps in Natural Resource Management: Sniffing 
for Leaks Along the Information Pipeline, 83 IND. L.J. 407, 408 (2008) (describing 
informational challenges); Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of 
Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE 
L.J. 1619, 1720-26 (2004); Sunstein, supra note 36, at 1653-54 (describing examples of 
tradeoffs); William E. Odum, Environmental Degradation and the Tyranny of Small 
Decisions, 32 BIOSCIENCE 728, 728 (1982) (describing the challenges of responding to 
problems caused by incremental harms). 
 90. See Brian Miles & Lawrence E. Band, Green Infrastructure Stormwater Management at the 
Watershed Scale: Urban Variable Source Area and Watershed Capacitance, 29 
HYDROLOGICAL PROCESSES 2268, 2269-70 (2015) (explaining the complexities and 
uncertainties of urban stormwater flow). 
 91. See Sharp, supra note 65, at 52-54 (noting the influence of vegetation changes and 
describing leaks as a source of groundwater recharge). 
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problematic practices. In both urban and agricultural landscapes, groundwater 
recharge is often a byproduct of inefficient or even sloppy water use.92 
Consequently, while people tend to praise efficient water use, efficiency 
improvements can have negative collateral consequences for groundwater 
recharge.93 Similarly, if a goal is to maximize groundwater recharge (and, more 
generally, water outflows of any kind) from forested landscapes, the simplest 
measure might be to eliminate the forest, which could increase flooding, 
decrease water quality, and undercut many of the other benefits brought by 
forested landscapes.94 Not every recharge-management measure will present 
difficult tradeoffs; there are also important synergies between increasing 
groundwater storage and other policy goals. Recharging urban stormwater, for 
example, is generally good for water storage and for surface-water quality 
(though it can also flood basements),95 and allowing rivers back into their 
floodplains can benefit aquatic species and reduce flooding risks further 
downstream, as well as enhancing groundwater storage.96 But in many 
circumstances, efforts to maximize groundwater recharge can create tensions 
with other important policy goals. 
Third, groundwater-recharge challenges often arise from the collective 
effects of many individual actions.97 In an urban area, for example, thousands 
of property owners are likely responsible for the roofs and paved areas that 
limit recharge—and for the leaky pipes that might partially offset the effects of 
those impervious surfaces. Even in rural areas, where parcels tend to be bigger, 
many landowners may share an aquifer’s recharge area. This diffusion of 
ownership, and therefore of potential responsibility, does not always exist; in 
the American West, for example, a single entity—the U.S. Forest Service—
 
 92. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
 93. See, e.g., Matt Weiser, Drip Irrigation: Not the Drought-Buster You Thought, NEW 
HUMANITARIAN: WATER DEEPLY (Sept. 25, 2015), https://perma.cc/A6FX-TV9E (“Some 
critics of drip irrigation have another complaint: It eliminates groundwater recharge, a 
side benefit of the water wasted in flood irrigation.”); Consejo de Desarrollo Economico 
de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing 
Mexico’s reliance on an aquifer recharged by seepage from southern California’s All-
American Canal). 
 94. See, e.g., Scanlon et al., supra note 38, at 3350 (describing recharge-rate increases “up to 
about 2 orders of magnitude” associated with deforestation in Australia); van 
Noordwijk et al., supra note 79, at 45 (explaining ways in which intact forests support 
water quality). 
 95. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. 
 96. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., FLOOD-MAR: USING FLOOD WATER FOR MANAGED  
AQUIFER RECHARGE TO SUPPORT SUSTAINABLE WATER RESOURCES 24, 26 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/S6TD-4SJF. 
 97. This challenge is not unique to groundwater. For a general discussion of the 
importance of cumulative-impact challenges, see Owen, supra note 35, at 143-44. 
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manages the land where most precipitation occurs.98 But in many places, the 
large number of landowners involved can make it quite difficult for individual 
landowners to understand or even notice their contributions to larger 
problems or solutions, and collective-action challenges can inhibit any attempt 
at solutions.99 
These complexities partly explain why groundwater-recharge law is not 
well developed, and they might also seem like good reasons to avoid its 
development. Indeed, as Part III explains in more detail, a threshold question 
about groundwater-recharge laws should be whether, for the particular place 
they are proposed, they will be more trouble than they are worth. But many 
places will not meet that description. In the United States alone, many areas 
already face severe groundwater-management challenges. A partial list might 
include California’s San Joaquin Valley; the Ogallala Aquifer, which extends 
from New Mexico and Texas to South Dakota; the Atlantic coastal plain; much 
of the Colorado River watershed; and even the seemingly well-watered lower 
Mississippi River Valley.100 In all of these places, water tables have plunged by 
dozens or even hundreds of feet, and groundwater depletion is so enormous 
that it is best measured in cubic kilometers.101 Unfortunately, these places are 
not outliers. In a world with a growing human population and an increasingly 
unstable climate, the need for groundwater-recharge management and an 
associated body of law will often be unavoidable, even if developing those legal 
regimes will be difficult. 
II. The Past and Present Law of Groundwater Recharge 
So how has the law addressed these challenges? In the United States, for the 
most part, it hasn’t, or at least hasn’t done so pursuant to any conscious 
design.102 Groundwater-recharge law does exist. But other than laws that 
 
 98. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ET AL., PNW-GTR-812, WATER, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND 
FORESTS: WATERSHED STEWARDSHIP FOR A CHANGING CLIMATE 6 (2010), 
https://perma.cc/6ZJQ-CWYZ (“National forests alone provide . . . over half the water 
in the West.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Wells, CAL. DEP’T WATER RES., https://perma.cc/ZY3W-TGB2 (archived  
Mar. 11, 2021) (estimating that “[a]s many as two million wells tap California’s 
groundwater”). On collective-action challenges with groundwater (and other 
resources), see Thompson, supra note 18, at 249-53, 258-65. 
100. See generally LEONARD F. KONIKOW, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. GEOLOGICAL 
SURV., SCIENCE INVESTIGATIONS REP. 2013-5079, GROUNDWATER DEPLETION IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1900-2008) (2013), https://perma.cc/8ZHB-QCH5 (providing an 
overview of areas with severe groundwater depletion). 
101. Id. at 4-7, 23-24. 
102. My research assistants and I searched the statutes and regulations of every state for 
references to groundwater recharge. That search provides the primary basis for my 
claims about missing elements of groundwater-recharge law. For each state, my 
footnote continued on next page 
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protect groundwater from polluted recharge103 or address deliberate recharge 
of imported surface water,104 groundwater-recharge law arises primarily as an 
incidental consequence of the pursuit of other priorities. Its coverage is also 
quite limited. 
This Part surveys the law of groundwater recharge.105 It focuses first on 
laws governing development of the land surface; then on laws affecting 
floodplains; then on laws governing vegetation management, primarily in 
forests and agricultural fields; and then, finally and more briefly, on the 
growing field of managed aquifer recharge.106 
 
research assistants and I searched Westlaw’s databases of statutory text, regulatory 
text, and case law. We began searches using the search terms “groundwater recharg!” 
and “groundwater regulation.” Because these search terms were both over- and 
underinclusive, we also used links and tables of contents to navigate from the code 
sections produced by our searches to other code sections. Finally, we supplemented the 
Westlaw searches with Google searches (using similar search terms), which we used to 
find agency websites and secondary-source coverage and to locate (or confirm the 
absence of) relevant code sections that our terms-based searches had missed. 
103. See supra note 32 (discussing federal laws protecting groundwater from contamination); 
see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 12-2-8 (2020) (providing authority for a regulatory program to 
protect recharge areas from potentially contaminating land uses); N.J. STAT. ANN.  
§ 58:11A-13 (West 2021) (requiring recharge-area mapping and publication of model 
ordinances designed to limit groundwater-contamination threats); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 485-C:1(II) (2021) (“The legislature finds that the most effective means of 
preserving the existing high quality of groundwater is by identification and careful 
management of operations or activities which may cause contamination of 
groundwater if not properly conducted.”). 
104. These laws exist primarily in western states. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-811.01 
(2021) (governing underground facility storage permits); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.135(1) 
(2019) (defining groundwater recharge as a beneficial use of surface water); IDAHO CODE 
§ 42-4202 (2021) (governing the formation of aquifer-recharge districts, which oversee 
artificial-recharge projects). 
105. This summary omits laws with more attenuated connections to groundwater recharge. 
In a sense, any law that affects human development or land-use patterns has 
implications for groundwater, at least if one follows the causal chains far enough. See, 
e.g., Dave Owen, Water and Taxes, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1559, 1572-85 (2017) (describing 
water-use incentives created by tax provisions). But to keep the scope of coverage 
manageable, the discussion here is more focused. 
106. Because of its relatively small footprint upon the landscape, mining is not discussed. 
But many of the references to groundwater recharge in state law come from provisions 
requiring restoration of recharge after surface mining of coal is complete. See, e.g., 312 
IND. ADMIN. CODE 25-6-22(a) (2021) (requiring restoration of recharge capacity); MD. 
CODE REGS. 26.20.20.02 (2021) (same). Those provisions in turn derive from the federal 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. See Pub. L. No. 95-87,  
§ 515(b)(10)(D), 91 Stat. 445, 489 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(10)(D)) 
(requiring state or federal permits to include provisions requiring the permittee to 
“restor[e] recharge capacity of the mined area to approximate premining conditions”). 
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A. Developing Land 
One of the most common ways humans affect recharge is by developing 
land. A robust legal regime for managing groundwater recharge therefore 
would address these impacts. Existing law is far from that ideal, however. Old 
common law doctrines, including the “common enemy rule,” allow 
landowners to ignore changes to groundwater recharge.107 In contrast, some 
newer legal requirements more directly address recharge, either by limiting 
the ability of development to create additional surface-water runoff or by 
protecting streams and wetlands—which often function as recharge zones—
from being filled.108 But the doctrines addressing development affect only 
small portions of the American landscape, and the scope of stream and wetland 
protections is currently under attack. 
1. The common enemy 
The oldest legal doctrine that directly (though not explicitly) addresses 
groundwater recharge is a property and tort rule known as the common-
enemy doctrine.109 On its face, the doctrine addresses the management of 
surface-water runoff before that surface water reaches a permanent 
watercourse or percolates into the ground.110 It addresses, in other words, 
overland drainage of rain and snowmelt.111 The core doctrine establishes that a 
landowner may do with that runoff as she will, even if that means redirecting 
it onto the property of downstream or downhill landowners.112 The origins of 
the rule are obscure, but courts and scholars generally trace its roots to 
nineteenth-century preferences for economic development and even older 
British distaste for swamps.113 The underlying ideas were that surface water 
was an inconvenience that each landowner was entitled to battle and that 
 
107. See ANTHONY DAN TARLOCK & JASON ANTHONY ROBISON, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND 
RESOURCES § 3:12 (West 2020). 
108. See infra Parts II.A.2-.3. 
109. See, e.g., Garbarino v. Van Cleave, 330 P.2d 28, 31 (Or. 1958) (“[N]o one has the right to 
complain that the volume of water in its natural channels is increased by the artificial 
drainage of lands which naturally drain therein.” (quoting TOM W. SMURR, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF FARM DRAINAGE FOUNDED ON THE LAWS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF THE 
STATE OF ILLINOIS § 3, at 5-6 (1909))). 
110. See TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 107, § 3.12. 
111. Id. 
112. See, e.g., Morrison v. Bucksport & Bangor R.R. Co., 67 Me. 353, 356 (1877) (“He may erect 
structures upon his own land as high as he pleases without regard to its effect upon 
surface water, no matter how much others are disturbed by it.”). 
113. See Jill M. Fraley, Water, Water, Everywhere: Surface Water Liability, 5 MICH. J. ENV’T & 
ADMIN. L. 73, 79, 93-94 (2015) (describing the origins and evolution of the common-
enemy rule). 
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maintaining a natural water cycle should not get in the way of economic 
exploitation of land.114 
As usually stated, the common-enemy rule doesn’t mention groundwater 
recharge, and cases involving the rule rarely discuss groundwater.115 But the 
rule clearly is part of groundwater-recharge law. The rule exists because 
development of land (and conversion of wetlands to agricultural use) often 
generates additional surface runoff. At least some of that additional surface 
runoff occurs because water that previously infiltrated into the ground, and 
thus recharged groundwater, is rerouted over the ground surface. The rule, in 
other words, is about dealing with the prevention of recharge. And its core 
tenet—that landowners have no obligation to address the consequences of 
recharge prevention—generates no incentive to worry about recharge loss. 
The traditional common-enemy rule no longer predominates in American 
common law.116 In states that still endorse the rule, qualifications abound, and 
other jurisdictions instead apply a rule of reasonableness to increased runoff 
associated with development patterns.117 But these alternative rules also are 
designed to accommodate some increase in runoff and, though they do not 
acknowledge it, concomitant decreases in groundwater recharge.118 The 
common law of surface runoff, in short, assigns groundwater recharge no 
value. 
2. Urbanization 
With groundwater recharge, as with most areas of law, the era of common 
law primacy has largely passed, and many modern statutes and regulatory 
schemes address ways in which development decreases stormwater runoff and 
increases surface flow. That body of law comes partly from the federal 
government but primarily from state and local governments, which have 
broad authority over development through their powers to zone land and set 
 
114. See id. 
115. For two cases involving the common-enemy rule that do mention groundwater, see B 
& B, LLC v. Lake Erie Land Co., 943 N.E.2d 917, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); and Scalesse v. 
Davis, No. 36610-0-II, 2009 WL 342972, at *1, *4, *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2009). 
Neither case focuses on groundwater recharge. 
116. See TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 107, § 3.12. 
117. Id.; see also Fraley, supra note 113, at 95-96 (describing exceptions to the common-
enemy rule). 
118. See TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 107, § 3.12 (“Most states follow a reasonable use rule 
that gives a property owner a qualified privilege to improve his property, alter 
drainage patterns, and tap into adjoining drains without the permission of the 
landowner.”). 
Law, Land Use, and Groundwater Recharge 
73 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (2021) 
1185 
building codes.119 In some places, these federal, state, and local laws promote 
groundwater recharge, though generally with the goal of limiting flooding 
rather than maintaining water supplies.120 But the geographic coverage of 
recharge-promoting laws remains limited.121 
Some groundwater-recharge law comes from laws focused primarily on 
stormwater management. The federal Clean Water Act requires midsized and 
larger municipalities to obtain (typically from state regulators) stormwater-
discharge permits,122 and those permits are supposed to include programs for 
managing postconstruction stormwater runoff—which, in lay terms, means 
managing water that the newly built impervious surfaces prevent from 
infiltrating into the ground.123 Independent of Clean Water Act permitting 
requirements, some states and municipalities require new or retrofitted 
construction projects to be designed to infiltrate most stormwater on site, at 
least so long as storms remain below designated thresholds.124 More 
ambitiously, some municipalities have created stormwater utilities, which 
charge property owners fees based on the amount of impervious area on their 
properties.125 Municipal stormwater managers then use the resulting revenue 
for stormwater-management projects, some of which may involve 
constructing “green infrastructure” for infiltration.126 Because of these 
 
119. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, VICKI BEEN, RODERICK M. HILLS, JR. & CHRISTOPHER SERKIN, 
LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 45 (4th ed. 2013) (“Public land use 
regulation in the United States traditionally has been mainly the province of local 
governments.”). 
120. A notable exception is Delaware, which makes recharge protection a central goal of its 
laws governing development and impervious cover. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6082(b) 
(2021). 
121. See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text. 
122. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p). 
123. 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b)(5) (2020); see also Env’t Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 846 
(9th Cir. 2003). 
124. See, e.g., SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF REGUL. ORDINANCES § 67.811(b) (2021) 
(providing stormwater-infiltration requirements for “Priority Development Projects”). 
See generally STORMWATER PERMIT MANUAL § 890 (West Supp. 2011) (summarizing 
state programs). 
125. See U.S. EPA NEW ENGLAND, EPA 901-F-09-004, FUNDING STORMWATER PROGRAMS 1 
(2009), https://perma.cc/4FKR-B9ZS (“More than 800 communities or districts across 
the country have adopted a stormwater utility . . . .”). See generally Avi Brisman, Considerations 
in Establishing a Stormwater Utility, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 505 (2002) (describing the operation 
of stormwater utilities). 
126. See NAT’L ESTUARY PROGRAM, U.S. EPA, EPA 842-R-14-005, GETTING TO GREEN: PAYING 
FOR GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE; FINANCING OPTIONS AND RESOURCES FOR LOCAL 
DECISION-MAKERS 1-2, 6-7 (2014), https://perma.cc/CQ8J-954Z; Erin Adele Scharff, 
Green Fees: The Challenge of Pricing Externalities Under State Law, 97 NEB. L. REV. 168, 
205-06 (2018). 
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requirements, there are some places in the United States where urbanization’s 
impacts on groundwater recharge are highly regulated.127 
Nevertheless, those places encompass a tiny percentage of the American 
landscape. Under the Clean Water Act, municipal stormwater permits only 
cover relatively densely populated areas, which means that many suburban 
and rural areas fall outside their coverage.128 Many state and local stormwater-
permitting programs cover only new development or redevelopment; existing 
impervious areas are often grandfathered.129 Additionally, even highly 
developed urban areas with low population density—for example, shopping 
malls—may be uncovered.130 Small projects also are routinely exempted from 
requirements for runoff control.131 And outside of already-urbanized areas, 
few states and cities have robust stormwater-management programs.132 The 
compliance costs associated with these programs can be substantial—
particularly if they cover existing development—which makes them 
controversial.133 Consequently, they have tended to emerge in places—the 
 
127. See Owen, supra note 63, at 454-55. 
128. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(D) (requiring permits only for municipal storm-sewer systems 
that serve over 100,000 people). 
129. See, e.g., 1 MASS. DEP’T OF ENV’T PROT., MASSACHUSETTS STORMWATER HANDBOOK 1-2 
(2008), https://perma.cc/VGL4-VZRB (to download, click “View the live page” and 
then click “Massachusetts Stormwater Handbook Vol. 1 Ch. 1, Stormwater 
Management Standards”). The handbook states: 
Loss of annual recharge to groundwater shall be eliminated or minimized through the use of 
infiltration measures including environmentally sensitive site design, low impact 
development techniques, stormwater best management practices, and good operation and 
maintenance. At a minimum, the annual recharge from the post-development site shall 
approximate the annual recharge from pre-development conditions based on soil type. 
  Id. at 1. That requirement applies to new but not existing development. Id. at 2. 
130. See Dave Owen et al., Collaboration, Clean Water Act Residual Designation Authority, and 
Collective Permitting: A Case Study of Long Creek, WATERSHED SCI. BULL., Fall 2010, at 25, 
27 (describing a mall-dominated watershed in Maine). 
131. See WATER PERMITS DIV., U.S. EPA, SUMMARY OF STATE POST CONSTRUCTION 
STORMWATER STANDARDS 3 tbl.1 (rev. 2016), https://perma.cc/53BQ-NZ6S 
(summarizing state standards for postconstruction runoff, most of which exempt 
projects that disturb less than an acre). 
132. See id. at 1, 3 tbl.1 (summarizing coverage and finding that many states have no 
stormwater-control requirements outside MS4 areas, which are “sites in regulated 
Phase I and Phase II Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System areas”); see also Allison H. 
Roy et al., Impediments and Solutions to Sustainable, Watershed-Scale Urban Stormwater 
Management: Lessons from Australia and the United States, 42 ENV’T MGMT. 344, 349 (2008) 
(noting that despite some local governments employing “[c]omprehensive stormwater 
ordinances,” there is “considerable variability in requirements within ordinances and 
[the] presence of such requirements nationwide”). 
133. See Janet E. Milne, Storms Ahead: Climate Change Adaptation Calls for Resilient Funding, 
39 VT. L. REV. 819, 862 (2015) (describing the political vulnerability of stormwater fees); 
Owen, supra note 63, at 486-88. 
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Chesapeake Bay134 or Lake Tahoe135 watersheds, for example—where a 
stressed and highly visible water resource inspires willingness to undertake 
ambitious regulatory programs, or in places where urban flooding problems 
lead municipal officials to think that green infrastructure might be cheaper 
than any alternative.136 In most places, regulation of development’s impacts on 
recharge remains minimal. And because the programs that do exist tend to be 
motivated by problems with flooding and surface-water pollution, not 
groundwater shortages, they are absent in many places where flooding and 
surface-water quality are less concerning but groundwater shortages are 
potentially severe.137 In summary, groundwater-recharge protection is often 
an incidental consequence of a spotty and incomplete system of urban 
stormwater regulation. 
In a few states, hints of an alternative system, in which maintaining 
groundwater recharge is a goal rather than an incidental consequence of land-
use development, do exist. Several states require mapping of areas with high 
recharge potential, though generally for the purpose of facilitating pollution-
prevention measures.138 Delaware, in contrast to most other states, has taken 
its program a few steps further; it couples a statewide mapping program with a 
requirement that local governments integrate recharge protection into their 
systems for regulating development.139 But Delaware is an outlier. Even states 
 
134. See Md. Dep’t of the Env’t v. Cnty. Comm’rs, 214 A.3d 61, 69-78 (Md. 2019) (describing 
Chesapeake Bay protection and stormwater management in Maryland). 
135. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306-11 
(2002) (describing the impetus for regulating runoff in the Lake Tahoe watershed); 
Water Quality & Stormwater Management, TAHOE REG’L PLAN. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/
N8UL-CK3D (archived Mar. 11, 2021). 
136. See, e.g., Bruce Stutz, With a Green Makeover, Philadelphia Is Tackling Its Stormwater 
Problem, YALE ENV’T 360 (Mar. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/VSC8-4ZVK (describing 
Philadelphia’s green-infrastructure program). 
137. See WATER PERMITS DIV., U.S. EPA, supra note 131, at 3 tbl.1 (summarizing state 
requirements, showing that many arid states have only minimal requirements and 
impose those requirements only in MS4 areas). 
138. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:11A-13 (West 2021) (“The Department of Environmental 
Protection . . . shall prepare and publish a methodology which shall allow the user to 
define, rank and map aquifer recharge areas.”); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 391-3-16.02 (2021) 
(describing recharge-area mapping); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-354c (2021) (requiring 
mapping of recharge areas for stratified-drift aquifers). 
139. See Delaware GroundWater Recharge Potential, DEL. FIRSTMAP DATA, https://perma.cc/
WN8P-VLV3 (archived Mar. 11, 2021) (to interact with map, click “View the live 
page”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6082(b) (2021) (requiring counties and municipalities to 
provide special planning for areas with “excellent ground-water recharge potential”). 
For an example of a local ordinance implementing these requirements, see Blades, Del., 
Wellhead and Excellent Groundwater Recharge Area Protection Ordinance (June 8, 
2009). 
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that otherwise have highly sophisticated systems of water law do little to 
directly address the impacts of development on groundwater recharge.140 
3. Stream and wetland fills 
Beyond addressing the general impacts of urbanization (and of other land 
uses), a comprehensive legal system for groundwater-recharge management 
would protect ephemeral streams and wetlands. Often—particularly in arid 
landscapes—those ephemeral water features are important sites for recharge 
because only in areas where water is concentrated can it penetrate otherwise 
moisture-starved soils and percolate down to the water table.141 In wetter 
landscapes, those streams and wetlands can play a somewhat different role, 
often by managing the timing of recharge and reducing fluctuations in stream 
levels—which means, in practical terms, putting more water into groundwater 
storage and less into floods.142 Some laws have traditionally protected those 
features, but they are under attack. 
In the United States, the primary protection of ephemeral streams and 
wetlands has come from the Clean Water Act.143 Section 301 of the Act 
prohibits the unpermitted discharge of pollutants into “navigable waters,”144 
which the statute defines as “waters of the United States.”145 Section 404 
permits discharges of dredged or fill material at “specified disposal sites” and 
thus creates an exception to section 301, but only if the discharging entity 
obtains a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.146 The Army Corps 
issues tens of thousands of these permits every year,147 but they come with 
strings attached; generally, permit recipients must avoid impacting streams or 
 
140. Water lawyers widely view Colorado, for example, as having one of the most 
sophisticated water-management systems in the country. But the Colorado statutory 
and administrative provisions pertaining to groundwater recharge are generally 
directed at managed recharge of surface water. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(9)(d) 
(2021) (establishing that the extraction of artificially recharged water is a beneficial 
use); COLO. CODE REGS. § 410-1 (2021) (establishing permitting rules for artificially 
recharged groundwater). 
141. See M.O. Cuthbert et al., Understanding and Quantifying Focused, Indirect Groundwater 
Recharge from Ephemeral Streams Using Water Table Fluctuations, 52 WATER RES. RSCH. 
827, 827 (2016) (“Groundwater recharge in drylands predominantly occurs via leakage 
from ephemeral streams.”). 
142. See McCauley et al., supra note 72, at 10 (asserting that losses of wetlands reduce 
groundwater storage and increase flooding). 
143. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388). 
144. 33 U.S.C. § 1311. 
145. Id. § 1362(7). 
146. Id. § 1344. 
147. See RYAN W. TAYLOR, FEDERALISM OF WETLANDS 88 (2013) (providing statistics). 
Law, Land Use, and Groundwater Recharge 
73 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (2021) 
1189 
wetlands if they can, minimize the unavoidable impacts they do create, and 
compensate for impacts that remain.148 Neither these specific provisions nor 
the Clean Water Act more generally focuses on groundwater; Congress’s 
central concern was with surface-water quality.149 But an incidental 
consequence of protecting stream and wetland areas is to protect zones where 
recharge often occurs.150 
These incidental protections have been evolving for decades.151 For many 
years, the trend was toward greater protection of temporary waterways.152 
The Army Corps was initially reluctant to require permitting for small 
wetlands and streams, and while it acknowledged its regulatory jurisdiction 
over them, it generally let people fill them at will.153 But over the course of 
several decades, extending through the Obama Administration, the Army 
Corps began requiring permitting for more small wetlands and more 
intermittent and even ephemeral streams, effectively increasing the scope of 
regulatory protections for many areas where concentrated recharge occurs.154 
More recently, however, a countervailing trend has predominated. The 
shift has its roots in Supreme Court decisions. In 2001, in Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Supreme Court held 
that isolated wetlands were not “waters of the United States” within the 
meaning of the Clean Water Act.155 And in 2006, in Rapanos v. United  
States,156 a fractured Court established multiple tests for the scope of federal 
Clean Water Act jurisdiction. One of those tests, which Justice Scalia 
articulated in a plurality opinion, would have eliminated Clean Water Act 
protection for most temporary streams and wetlands.157 The Rapanos decision 
 
148. Permit Program Under CWA Section 404: Overview, U.S. EPA, https://perma.cc/2NLG-
PW3J (last updated June 17, 2020). 
149. See Kaela Shiigi, Note, Underground Pathways to Pollution: The Need for Better Guidance on 
Groundwater Hydrologically Connected to Surface Water, 46 ECOLOGY L.Q. 519, 524, 527 
(2019) (noting that “the CWA does not mention hydrologically connected 
groundwater” and describing the legislative history behind this selective focus). 
150. See WINTER ET AL., supra note 11, at 9-10 (describing how “losing streams”—those that 
“lose water to ground water by outflow through the streambed”—can recharge 
aquifers). 
151. See generally Dave Owen, Little Streams and Legal Transformations, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 1 
(describing changes in the law of stream protection). 
152. See id. at 15-31. 
153. Id. at 20-22. 
154. See id. at 29-31. 
155. 531 U.S. 159, 162-63 (2001). 
156. 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
157. See id. at 732 (plurality opinion) (“On this definition, ‘the waters of the United States’ 
include only relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water.”). 
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initially had a modest impact because the Army Corps and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) generally followed a “significant nexus” test 
articulated by Justice Kennedy,158 and the agencies often concluded that 
intermittent and ephemeral water features met this test.159 And in 2015, the 
agencies finalized regulations that would have codified those broad 
protections.160 But the Trump Administration launched a frontal assault on 
the 2015 regulations and on Clean Water Act jurisdiction more generally.161 Its 
new regulations, finalized in 2020, eliminated all Clean Water Act protections 
for ephemeral streams and ephemeral (and some non-ephemeral) wetlands.162 
This change does not necessarily mean that recharge zones can now be 
filled at will. The Clean Water Act reserves states’ abilities to establish more 
stringent protections,163 and states also have broad power to regulate land use, 
 
158. See id. at 780, 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy explained 
that “wetlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase 
‘navigable waters,’ if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly 
situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’ ” Id. at 780. 
159. See J.B. Ruhl, Proving the Rapanos Significant Nexus, NAT. RES. & ENV’T, Summer 2018, at 
51, 52 (“All circuit courts that have ruled on the matter have concluded that an area 
meeting Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test is within CWA jurisdiction, although 
some circuit courts have decided that jurisdiction applies if the area meets either the 
significant nexus test or the plurality’s ‘relatively permanent’ test.”); Owen, supra  
note 151, at 29-31 (describing regulatory protections for ephemeral streams). 
160. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 
(June 29, 2015) (repealed 2019). 
161. See Definition of ‘‘Waters of the United States’’—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 
84 Fed. Reg. 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts 
of 40 C.F.R.) (repealing the 2015 rule); Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Rulemaking 
Process, U.S. EPA, https://perma.cc/3DCA-XDC4 (last updated Aug. 27, 2020); John 
Flesher, Trump Administration Drops Obama-Era Water Protection Rule, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Sept. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/U48U-PY4L. 
162. The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of ‘‘Waters of the United States,’’ 85 
Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,251 (Apr. 21, 2020) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts 
of 40 C.F.R.). The Biden Administration has stated its interest in revisiting the 2020 
regulations, and the EPA and Army Corps have requested stays in litigation 
challenging those regulations. See Jeremy P. Jacobs & Pamela King, Biden Races  
Courts for Chance to Torpedo Trump Water Rule, GREENWIRE (Apr. 28, 2021), 
https://perma.cc/3K64-5YVP (describing the evolving status of the litigation). But as 
this Article goes to press, neither the White House nor the EPA or Army Corps has 
stated specific plans for future rules, and the 2020 regulations remain in effect. Id. 
163. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 723 (1994) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“Not a single sentence, phrase, or word in the Clean Water 
Act purports to place any constraint on a State’s power to regulate the quality of its 
own waters more stringently than federal law might require.”). 
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so states could step in to fill the emerging federal voids.164 But in many areas, 
that void is unlikely to be filled. Many states have opted to just rely on federal 
law for stream and wetland protection.165 Some even have laws specifically 
forbidding state agencies from adopting any protections that go beyond federal 
law.166 And that federal protection now has an uncertain future. 
The impacts of these regulatory changes upon recharge also are likely to 
be complex, and they may vary from watershed to watershed. One possibility 
is that filling more streams or wetlands means a reduction in the area where 
recharge occurs, which in turn means less recharge and more surface flow. 
Studies from the Northern Plains suggest that this outcome will sometimes 
occur.167 But in other landscapes, different results are possible. Filling a stream 
or wetland does not eliminate the precipitation that once created that stream 
or wetland; it still must go somewhere, and its new flow path may offer greater 
or lesser possibilities for infiltration. Indeed, because wetlands and stream 
channels often concentrate vegetation as well as water, moving that water 
elsewhere in the landscape might reduce transpiration levels, which could 
sometimes lead to greater amounts of recharge.168 The scientific literature on 
these questions is very limited—many studies note that streams and wetlands 
are important sites for recharge,169 but few discuss how overall recharge levels 
would change if those streams or wetlands were lost. Thus, the reductions in 
stream and wetland protections may best be viewed as, among many other 
things, an uncontrolled experiment in groundwater-recharge manipulation. 
B. Managing Floods 
For some of the same reasons that temporary streams and wetlands can be 
important to groundwater recharge, floodplains also are important. 
Floodplains are zones where floodwaters spill beyond permanent surface-
water features and inundate the landscape. Some of that water evaporates and 
 
164. California is the most prominent state to have done so. See Bettina Boxall, California 
Adopts New Wetlands Rules to Protect Them from Trump Rollbacks, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2, 
2019, 4:15 PM), https://perma.cc/XL4Y-9A6B. 
165. See Phillip Bower & Megan McLean, The Proposed WOTUS Rule: How Do States Regulate 
Nonfederal Wetlands?, TRENDS (Am. Bar Ass’n Section Env’t, Energy & Res., Chi., Ill.), 
Mar./Apr. 2019, at 6, 6-8 (noting that many states rely on Clean Water Act section 401 
for wetlands authority). 
166. See Andrew Hecht, Note, Obstacles to the Devolution of Environmental Protection: States’ 
Self-Imposed Limitations on Rulemaking, 15 DUKE ENV’T. L. & POL’Y F. 105, 115-16, 116 
n.42 (2004). 
167. See McCauley et al., supra note 72, at 10. 
168. See van der Kamp & Hayashi, supra note 72, at 49 (explaining that in prairie wetlands, 
most recharged groundwater supports the vegetation surrounding the wetland). 
169. See, e.g., OFF. OF RSCH. & DEV., U.S. EPA, supra note 73, at 1-8. 
Law, Land Use, and Groundwater Recharge 
73 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (2021) 
1192 
some of it eventually flows back into the river or stream from which it came. 
But in many floodplain areas, some floodwaters infiltrate into the ground, 
where they may be available for pumping or may gradually flow back through 
the ground and then into surface waterways.170 Flood-zone recharge therefore 
can supply multiple important benefits: It can dissipate the flood, and it also 
stores water that can replenish surface flows in drier periods (or can be 
pumped for other human uses).171 
Well-designed groundwater-recharge laws therefore might seek to 
preserve rivers’ connections with their floodplains. They might do this in 
several ways. Local governments, which typically hold authority to zone land, 
might limit floodplain development and select undeveloped land uses that can 
accommodate some flooding.172 State and federal river-management agencies, 
like the Army Corps or the Bureau of Reclamation, might manage dams to 
promote periodic flooding and might try to direct river flows into areas where 
groundwater recharge will occur.173 And where flood-control infrastructure 
already exists, its governmental managers might seek to selectively dismantle 
it, ideally allowing floods to expand into areas with strong recharge potential 
(and with landowners who will agree, perhaps for a price, to allow flooding of 
their lands).174 More ambitiously, and also more intrusively, government 
regulators might ask owners of flood-protected land to take some steps to 
compensate for the recharge those lands no longer provide. 
For most of our history, however, the United States’ policy has been to do 
exactly the opposite. For decades, the Army Corps and other federal, state, and 
local agencies have focused on keeping floodwaters out of floodplains.175 They 
(and local governments and private entities) have built thousands of dams, often 
 
170. See R. Doble et al., Modelling Overbank Flood Recharge at a Continental Scale, 18 
HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS. SCIS. 1273, 1274 (2014). 
171. See OFF. OF RSCH. & DEV., U.S. EPA, supra note 73, at 4-5 tbl.4-1. 
172. See James M. Holway & Raymond J. Burby, Reducing Flood Losses: Local Planning and 
Land Use Controls, 59 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 205, 212 (1993); JAMES M. WRIGHT, Strategies and 
Tools to Maintain or Restore Floodplain Resources, in FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT: 
PRINCIPLES AND CURRENT PRACTICES 9-1, 9-3 (2007), https://perma.cc/5K82-CD6M 
(providing examples of floodplain-compatible land uses). 
173. See, e.g., Robert M. Gailey et al., Maximizing On-Farm Groundwater Recharge with Surface 
Reservoir Releases: A Planning Approach and Case Study in California, USA, 27 
HYDROGEOLOGY J. 1183, 1185-86 (2019) (describing the possibility of using timed 
releases from Folsom Reservoir). 
174. See, e.g., RAMONA O. SWENSON ET AL., NATURE CONSERVANCY, RESTORING FLOODS TO 
FLOODPLAINS: RIPARIAN AND FLOODPLAIN RESTORATION AT THE COSUMNES RIVER 
PRESERVE 3-4 (2003), https://perma.cc/X28K-S3QC (describing the use of intentional 
levee breaches for floodplain restoration). 
175. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, United States Flood Control Policy: The Incomplete Transition 
from the Illusion of Total Protection to Risk Management, 23 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 151 
(2012) (describing the rise and partial fall of this policy). 
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partly for the legislatively specified purpose of storing floodwaters and thus 
eliminating downstream flooding.176 Governmental and nongovernmental 
actors also have built thousands of miles of levees, again with the primary 
purpose of isolating rivers from their floodplains.177 Development—often 
facilitated by local zoning laws and federal flood insurance—often springs up 
behind those levees, further limiting the option of allowing rivers beyond their 
banks.178 Other land-management practices also disconnect rivers and streams 
from floodplains. Both cattle grazing, which is common on western lands, and 
urbanization can cause “downcutting” of streams, which means that streams 
erode deep gullies that prevent even high flows from spilling onto the 
surrounding land.179 The consequence is that many formerly significant 
groundwater-recharge zones have been idled, with the idling directly caused by 
physical infrastructure and more indirectly facilitated by federal legislation and 
state and local land-use law. All of these flood-limiting practices tend to occur 
with little or no discussion of—let alone legal response to—their impacts on 
groundwater recharge. The upshot is that there are flood-prone regions—
Houston and Baton Rouge, for example—where people must worry 
simultaneously about having too much water above the ground and not enough 
below, and where the land subsidence associated with groundwater deficits 
makes surface-water-flooding problems even worse.180 
 
176. Id. at 160-65 (describing the emergence of flood-control dams); Dave Owen & Colin 
Apse, Trading Dams, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1043, 1052-53 (2015) (summarizing statistics 
on the number of dams in the United States). 
177. See Kara Scheel et al., Understanding the Large-Scale Influence of Levees on Floodplain 
Connectivity Using a Hydrogeomorphic Approach, 55 J. AM. WATER RES. ASS’N 413, 414 
(2019) (describing rivers disconnected from most of their floodplain, along with the 
difficulties of calculating aggregate-scale impacts of levees); U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
Levees of the Nation, NAT’L LEVEE DATABASE, https://perma.cc/EP8V-Y7QN (archived 
Mar. 11, 2021) (stating that, as of March 2021, the United States had 25,618 miles of 
levees). 
178. See Jessica Ludy & G. Matt Kondolf, Flood Risk Perception in Lands ‘‘Protected’’ by 100 -Year 
Levees, 61 NAT. HAZARDS 829, 830-32 (2012) (observing that development often occurs 
behind levees, facilitated by misperceptions of risk and by the National Flood 
Insurance Program’s classification of levee-protected areas as non-floodplain); 
Raymond J. Burby, Flood Insurance and Floodplain Management: The US Experience, 3 
ENV’T HAZARDS 111, 111 (2001) (“[E]xtensive development has occurred in areas with 
the greatest risk from flood hazards, and the rate of development, rather than 
decreasing, has actually increased at unprecedented rates over the past 30 yr [sic].”). 
179. See, e.g., Robert J. Hawley et al., Suburban Stream Erosion Rates in Northern Kentucky 
Exceed Reference Channels by an Order of Magnitude and Follow Predictable Trajectories of 
Channel Evolution, GEOMORPHOLOGY, Mar. 1, 2020, at 1, 6 fig.3, 10 figs.10 & 11 (showing 
diagrams and photographs of downcutting suburban streams); A.J. Belsky et al., Survey 
of Livestock Influences on Stream and Riparian Ecosystems in the Western United States, 54 J. 
SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 419, 427 (1999). 
180. See, e.g., Bob Rehak, How Montgomery County Could Keep Sinking, HOUS. CHRON. (updated 
Nov. 5, 2018, 9:18 PM), https://perma.cc/B3XD-5WUC; ADRIAN MCINNIS ET AL., 
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There are also now areas where practices are changing. In Washington 
State, for example, the Washington Department of Ecology and the Nature 
Conservancy have partnered on a “Floodplains by Design” program designed to 
reintroduce rivers to surrounding floodplains.181 The Natural Resource 
Conservation Service has spent millions of dollars purchasing flooding 
easements from willing landowners in flood-prone areas,182 and while the 
regulatory criteria for selecting purchased lands do not include groundwater-
recharge potential,183 at least some of the resulting flooding is likely to 
recharge aquifers.184 More recently, California’s Central Valley Flood 
Protection Board adopted policies designed to encourage reconnection of rivers 
with their floodplains, partly with the goal of increasing groundwater 
recharge.185 Some pilot projects show promising results.186 Yet these remain 
isolated examples, and notably, the recharge benefits that occur generally 
happen because government or nonprofit entities pay landowners to partially 
restore recharge levels that their lands once provided for free.187 The idea that 
anyone is obligated to allow floodplain recharge has not yet been part of the 
legal discussion. 
C. Forests and Fields 
As the preceding sections show, law affects groundwater recharge by 
regulating (or deliberately not regulating) development’s impacts on surface-
water runoff and by protecting (or deliberately not protecting) floodplains and 
 
WATER INST. OF THE GULF, STATE OF THE SCIENCE TO SUPPORT LONG-TERM WATER 
RESOURCE PLANNING 65 (2020), https://perma.cc/8Q3C-SHCD (describing historic 
subsidence in the Baton Rouge area); Steve Hardy, Baton Rouge Water Company Says 
Industry Needs to Stop Drawing Water from Aquifer, ADVOCATE (July 1, 2017, 4:02 PM), 
https://perma.cc/SB2V-3EUE. 
181. FLOODPLAINS BY DESIGN, https://perma.cc/5A7Y-7LMB (archived Mar. 11, 2021). 
182. See 16 U.S.C. § 2203 (authorizing floodplain-easement purchases); see, e.g., NRCS Offers 
More than $200 Million in Emergency Funding to Restore Flood-Prone Lands, TRI-STATE 
LIVESTOCK NEWS (July 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/4376-V9SU. 
183. See 7 C.F.R. § 624.10 (2020) (providing limited criteria for choosing lands and not 
including groundwater-recharge potential). 
184. See Emergency Watershed Protection Program, 70 Fed. Reg. 16,921, 16,925 (Apr. 4, 
2005) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 624) (noting groundwater-recharge benefits). 
185. See Matt Weiser, A Landmark California Plan Puts Floodplains Back in Business, NEW 
HUMANITARIAN: WATER DEEPLY (Oct. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/3M2N-3AEK. 
186. See, e.g., SWENSON ET AL., supra note 174 (describing the benefits of floodplain 
restoration along California’s Cosumnes River). 
187. See, e.g., EWP Floodplain Easement Program—Floodplain Easement Option (EWPP-FPE), 
USDA NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., https://perma.cc/6CH8-DCCJ (archived  
Mar. 12, 2021) (describing the EWP Floodplain Easement Program, which relies on 
voluntary easement purchases). 
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temporary waterways. But collectively, developed areas, temporary 
waterways, and floodplains make up a small portion of the landscapes 
influenced by human activity. In many other areas, humans affect 
groundwater recharge primarily by managing forests, rangelands, and farms. 
These impacts should be important to a system of groundwater law, for most 
of our precipitation falls on forests and agricultural lands,188 and much of that 
precipitation is transpired by vegetation.189 Consequently, management of 
those lands can either increase or decrease recharge levels, sometimes 
significantly. With limited exceptions, however, law does not address these 
impacts. 
1. Water and the woods 
A comprehensive system of groundwater-recharge law would likely start 
in the woods. Most of the United States’ freshwater flows begin in forests, and 
in the western United States the proportion is even higher.190 Forests also 
regulate the timing and amount of water flows.191 Most importantly, they 
limit recharge because trees and other plants use water; much of the 
precipitation that falls in forests is taken up by plants’ roots and transpired.192 
But forests also facilitate recharge by covering the ground with decaying leaf 
litter, into which water readily infiltrates and through which lateral overland 
 
188. This is because most of our nondesert land is either forested, cultivated, or grazed. See 
Cynthia Nickerson & Allison Borchers, How Is Land in the United States Used? A Focus  
on Agricultural Land, ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Mar. 1, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/WDG2-2T5U (noting that in 2007, 51% of the United States’ land area 
was in agricultural use); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., U.S. FOREST RESOURCE FACTS AND 
HISTORICAL TRENDS 7 (2014), https://perma.cc/VD7S-UQL3 (“In 2012, forest land 
comprised 766 million acres, or 33 percent of the total land area of the United States.”). 
There is some overlap between these two categories because some forested land is also 
agricultural. 
189. See Ronald L. Hanson, Evapotranspiration and Droughts, in NATIONAL WATER SUMMARY 
1988-89—HYDROLOGIC EVENTS AND FLOODS AND DROUGHTS 99, 99 (Richard W. Paulson 
et al., 1991). 
190. U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC. ET AL., supra note 98, at 6 (“In the Western United States, 65 
percent of the water supply comes from forests.”). 
191. Katherine J. Elliott et al., Water Yield Following Forest-Grass-Forest Transitions, 21 
HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS. SCIS. 981, 981 (2017) (“Forests play a critical role in regulating 
hydrological processes in headwater catchments by moderating the timing and 
magnitude of streamflow.”). 
192. See Matheussen et al., supra note 27, at 868 (“Removal of forest cover is known to 
increase streamflow as a result of reduced evapotranspiration and to increase peak 
flows as a result of higher water tables.”). 
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flows are impeded.193 Additionally, the water that trees transpire can create 
additional precipitation, and thus more recharge, further downwind.194 
These activities are heavily impacted by human management of forests. 
Generally speaking, a forest with more growing biomass will transpire more 
water, which means that it will provide less recharge and less outflow.195 
Consequently, human activities that create or thicken forests, like fire 
suppression or forest planting, can reduce water supplies,196 while thinning 
forests, letting them burn, or removing them entirely can enhance the quantity 
(though often not the quality) of water supplies.197 These relationships are not 
always consistent; logging a forest, for example, can lead to road building, soil 
compaction, and more rapid snowmelt,198 which can reduce recharge. And 
regenerating forests may actually transpire more water than the mature stands 
they replace.199 Also, increasing water flows out of forests isn’t necessarily the 
same as increasing groundwater recharge. Water may leave the forest 
primarily as surface flow, and unless those surface flows enter zones where a 
stream is losing water to its bed or floodplain (or to nearby irrigated areas), 
those flows may not become groundwater again.200 Nevertheless, there are 
many areas where the water that fills aquifers must first pass through a forest, 
 
193. See van Noordwijk et al., supra note 79, at 33. 
194. Id. at 35-36. 
195. See Ge Sun et al., Impacts of Forest Biomass Removal on Water Yield Across the United States, 
in 2016 BILLION-TON REPORT: ADVANCING DOMESTIC RESOURCES FOR A THRIVING 
BIOECONOMY—VOLUME 2, at 211, 212 (2017), https://perma.cc/J9QV-BTDW. 
196. See van Noordwijk et al., supra note 79, at 43 (“[M]ost studies [of afforestation] reported 
decreases in water yields following the intervention.”). 
197. See Dennis W. Hallema et al., Burned Forests Impact Water Supplies, NATURE COMMC’NS, 
Apr. 10, 2018, at 1, 2; Julia A. Jones et al., Forest Landscape Hydrology in a “New Normal” 
Era of Climate and Land Use Change, in FOREST AND WATER ON A CHANGING PLANET, 
supra note 79, at 81, 85 (describing the effects of timber harvesting). 
198. See Jones et al., supra note 197, at 85. 
199. See Elliott et al., supra note 191, at 988-90 (finding that a growing forest used more 
water than a mature forest that had previously occupied the same land). 
200. This is likely to be true in humid climates, where rivers and streams continue to gain 
flow from surrounding groundwater over much of their course. It is less likely to be 
true in places like the American West, where arid lowland climates and pumping-
related aquifer depletion mean that many low-elevation watercourses are disconnected 
from the water table. See Laura E. Condon & Reed M. Maxwell, Evaluating the 
Relationship Between Topography and Groundwater Using Outputs from a Continental-Scale 
Integrated Hydrology Model, 51 WATER RES. RSCH. 6602, 6610 fig.4 (2015) (showing 
groundwater-table depth and flow direction in the western and eastern United States); 
see also, e.g., Rebecca Nelson & Leon Szeptycki, Groundwater, Rivers, Ecosystems and 
Conflicts, WATER IN THE WEST (updated Dec. 19, 2014), https://perma.cc/XE45-TBDT 
(describing areas where groundwater pumping has depleted surface-water ecosystems). 
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and human management of that forest partially determines the extent to 
which those aquifers fill.201 
For all of these reasons, one might expect water law and forest law to be 
highly integrated. And in a few ways, they are and have been for a long time. In 
the nineteenth century, in reaction to massive floods that followed widespread 
clearcutting, the United States established its national forests.202 Managing 
water flows was, and remains, a central purpose of federal forest law; indeed, 
the Supreme Court once held that timber provision and water-flow 
management were the only purposes for which the national forest system was 
originally created.203 At the federal level, a series of additional statutes has 
broadened the purposes of forest management and has created a procedural 
framework for forest-management planning.204 Within that framework, the 
sweeping and open-ended mandates of federal forest law leave ample room for 
the Forest Service to make water management generally, and promotion of 
groundwater recharge more specifically, a key component of its planning 
goals.205 States, meanwhile, hold broad authority to regulate private and state-
held forest lands206 and could, in theory, use that authority to manage forests 
with water management as a central goal. 
In practice, however, forest-management and water law mostly occupy 
different realms.207 Several subareas of forest law exemplify this disconnect. 
One is fire-management policy. For decades, the Forest Service had a policy of 
 
201. In California, for example, most precipitation falls, and recharge processes therefore 
begin, in the forested Sierra Nevada and the Coast Ranges, but the significant aquifers 
are in valleys. Claudia C. Faunt et al., Introduction, Overview of Hydrogeology, and Textural 
Model of California’s Central Valley, in GROUNDWATER AVAILABILITY OF THE CENTRAL 
VALLEY AQUIFER, CALIFORNIA 1, 21 fig.A9 (Claudia C. Faunt ed., 2009) (showing a cross 
section of the Central Valley Aquifer). 
202. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ET AL., supra note 98, at 4 (describing the origins of the national 
forests). 
203. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707-13 (1978). 
204. See National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); Forest and Rangeland Renewable 
Resource Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476 (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614); Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 
Stat. 215 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531). 
205. See 16 U.S.C. § 528 (“It is the policy of the Congress that the national forests are 
established and shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, 
and wildlife and fish purposes.”); id. § 1604(e), (g) (directing the Forest Service to factor 
watersheds into forest management). 
206. See Blake Hudson, Dynamic Forest Federalism, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1643, 1668-70 
(2014). 
207. See David Ellison et al., Governance Options for Addressing Changing Forest-Water 
Relations, in FOREST AND WATER ON A CHANGING PLANET, supra note 79, at 147, 151 
(“[F]orest-water interactions have been almost entirely ignored in the management of 
global freshwater resources.”). 
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aggressive fire suppression, which meant trying to put out every fire in the 
forests as quickly as possible.208 That policy thickened forests, sometimes 
dramatically,209 and may have reduced the amount of water exiting those 
forests.210 But only recently has the Forest Service begun paying attention to 
the water-management implications of its fire-suppression policies, and the 
Forest Service still treats those implications as a matter to which attention is 
discretionary rather than as a field involving legal obligations.211 Outside of 
the southeastern United States, where prescribed burning has been a common 
practice for decades, many states and private landholders are just as committed 
to fire suppression as the Forest Service.212 That does not mean they succeed in 
preventing fires; one of the hardest lessons of forest-fire policy has been that 
suppression, in the long run, just makes the fires that do occur larger and more 
catastrophic (which also means providing episodic and unpredictable boosts to 
groundwater recharge and to surface-water flows).213 But the emphasis on fire 
suppression has probably reduced past flows and, to the extent it is successful, 
will continue to limit flows in the future.214 
 
208. See Stephens & Sugihara, supra note 70, at 433-34. 
209. See Aaron W. Fellows & Michael L. Goulden, Has Fire Suppression Increased the Amount 
of Carbon Stored in Western U.S. Forests?, GEOPHYSICAL RSCH. LETTERS, June 28, 2008, at 1, 
1 (noting “a shift from sparser forests, which are dominated by a few large trees, to 
denser forests, which are dominated by many small trees”). 
210. The relationships are complicated because a denser forest may have fewer large trees 
and therefore less overall biomass, see id., but a forest dominated by large trees may use 
less water than one primarily composed of smaller, immature trees. See Elliott et al., 
supra note 191, at 987 (reporting findings “suggesting that the new forest used more 
water (i.e., had higher [evapotranspiration]) than expected had it not undergone 
treatment”). 
211. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ET AL., supra note 98, at 52 (describing management options 
but not legal obligations). 
212. See Sophie Quinton & Alex Brown, California May Need More Fire to Fix Its Wildfire 
Problem, PEW CHARITABLE TRS.: STATELINE (Sept. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/7XF2-
2XK4 (describing disincentives for burning on nonfederal land); Fire, OR. DEP’T 
FORESTRY, https://perma.cc/HA33-AGX8 (archived Mar. 12, 2021) (“ODF ’s firefighting 
policy is straightforward: Put out fires quickly at the smallest possible size.”). On the 
different policies in the southeast, see Jim Brenner & Dale Wade, Florida’s Revised 
Prescribed Fire Law: Protection for Responsible Burners, in PROCEEDINGS OF FIRE 
CONFERENCE 2000: THE FIRST NATIONAL CONGRESS ON FIRE ECOLOGY, PREVENTION, AND 
MANAGEMENT 132, 133 (K.E.M. Galley et al. eds., 2003) (“Florida has led the nation in 
acreage treated with prescribed fire every year since records have been kept . . . .”). 
213. See Stephen J. Pyne, Between Two Fires: The Past and Future of Fire in America, 18 PENN 
ST. ENV’T L. REV. 129, 134-36 (2010) (describing the unraveling of fire suppression); 
Scott L. Stephens & Lawrence W. Ruth, Federal Forest-Fire Policy in the United States, 15 
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 532, 533 (2005). 
214. See Gabrielle F.S. Boisramé et al., Restoring a Natural Fire Regime Alters the Water Balance 
of a Sierra Nevada Catchment, 55 WATER RES. RSCH. 5751, 5766 (2019) (“The 
reintroduction of a near-natural wildfire regime to the [Illilouette Creek Basin] has 
footnote continued on next page 
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Similarly, while the negative impact of timber harvesting upon water 
quality has long been a subject of close legal attention (and deservedly so), the 
complicated relationship between timber harvesting and water quantity rarely 
becomes a focus of legal concern. The National Forest Management Act, for 
example, speaks directly to limiting the impact of timber harvesting on water 
quality, but says nothing specific about using forest management to augment 
the quantity of flows.215 The Forest Service’s implementing regulations share 
that same focus; they provide more detailed provisions for protecting 
watersheds from timber harvesting, but they likewise say nothing specific 
about using timber harvesting or fire policy to manage flow levels.216 State 
laws are similar. California’s forest-management rules, for example, contain 
many pages about protecting watersheds from timber-management practices 
but again say nothing about groundwater recharge or about managing the 
quantity of surface-water flows.217 Water law in at least one western state also 
precludes land managers from claiming rights in additional flows created by 
vegetation management.218 In Colorado, if a land manager removes invasive 
tamarisk trees from a watershed, thus reducing transpiration, the “developed 
water” produced by that activity is allocated under the normal rules of prior 
appropriation, and the landowner has no special claim to the increased flow.219 
This disconnect between forest and water policy is not unique to the United 
States. In much of the world, forestry law is concerned primarily with timber 
production, erosion control, biodiversity protection, and, more recently, carbon 
sequestration.220 Affecting groundwater recharge, and water-flow levels more 
generally, can be an important—and sometimes problematic—incidental 
 
reduced transpiration, increased peak snowpack while leading to earlier snowmelt 
overall, increased subsurface water storage in the basin, and is likely to have increased 
streamflow.”). 
215. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g). 
216. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.8(a)(2) (2020) (requiring forest-management plans to address water 
quality and the ecological integrity of within-forest streams but establishing no clear 
requirements for addressing flows out of the forest). 
217. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 916-916.12, 936-936.12, 956-956.12 (2021). 
218. See Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Colo. 
1974) (en banc). 
219. Id. (“[T]hirsty men cannot step into the shoes of a ‘water thief ’ (the phreatophytes.) . . . 
The property (the water) must return from whence it comes—the river—and thereon 
down the line to those the river feeds in turn.”). 
220. See Ellison et al., supra note 207, at 151 (“To date, the traditional paradigm has been to 
manage forests for their ability to provide biomass, for their multi-functional uses, 
and/or for their ability to sequester carbon.”). 
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consequence of forest policy.221 But it has rarely been an element of legal 
frameworks. There are exceptions; South Africa, for example, requires 
developers of tree plantations to obtain water-supply permits.222 But in most 
places, forest law and water-quantity law lack purposeful integration. 
2. Agriculture, irrigated and otherwise 
Just as forests have a complex relationship with groundwater, so does 
agricultural activity. In the United States and around the world, agriculture is 
the primary use of groundwater.223 It also is often the most problematic use; 
the most extreme groundwater crises tend to occur in places, like California’s 
San Joaquin Valley or the High Plains’ Ogallala Aquifer, where use is primarily 
agricultural.224 But even as it sometimes depletes aquifers, agriculture also can 
augment groundwater recharge. In some dryland agricultural areas, that 
increased recharge occurs because planted crops transpire less water than the 
vegetation they replace.225 In irrigated areas, the recharge may come from 
excess application of water to crops.226 That water may be from the same 
aquifer to which the recharge returns, and the recharge thus may just partially 
offset the depletion caused by groundwater pumping. Alternatively, the 
recharge may come from imported surface water and thus may increase aquifer 
storage—sometimes problematically, to the point of flooding crops—though it 
does so at the expense of surface flows someplace else.227 
In theory, law could address these complicated interactions in several 
ways. Most obviously, state and local land-use laws determine where 
 
221. See, e.g., Shixiong Cao et al., Greening China Naturally, 40 AMBIO 828, 829 (2011) 
(describing the problematic and unanticipated water-supply impacts of China’s 
afforestation policies). 
222. Bhaskar Vira et al., Management Options for Dealing with Changing Forest-Water 
Relations, in FOREST AND WATER ON A CHANGING PLANET, supra note 79, at 121, 135. 
223. See The Basics: What Is Groundwater?, GROUNDWATER FOUND., https://perma.cc/R4X5-
ZRC7 (archived Mar. 12, 2021) (providing statistics on groundwater use in the United 
States); Facts About Global Groundwater Usage, NAT’L GROUND WATER ASS’N, 
https://perma.cc/26AQ-FGW6 (archived Mar. 12, 2021) (“About 70% of groundwater 
withdrawn worldwide is used for agriculture.”). 
224. See Groundwater Decline and Depletion, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://perma.cc/V4X2-
47Y4 (archived Mar. 12, 2021) (mapping locations with heavy groundwater depletion). 
225. See Han et al., supra note 65, at 546. 
226. Id. at 547. 
227. See, e.g., Firebaugh Canal Co. v. United States, 203 F.3d 568, 570-72 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(describing drainage problems caused by irrigating lands in California’s San Joaquin 
Valley). The same combination of depletion in one place and excess water in another 
can arise if groundwater is pumped from below a confining layer and then recharges a 
shallow aquifer. 
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agriculture can occur and where competing land uses cannot occur,228 and 
much of the field of surface-water law governs deliveries of irrigation water.229 
Both fields therefore incidentally help determine the locations and amounts of 
agriculture-related groundwater recharge. Additionally, as water law 
increasingly focuses on the efficiency of water use (and as technology makes 
efficient water use more feasible), it will necessarily limit the extent of 
groundwater recharge.230 More specifically, land-use and water laws might 
create incentives for maximizing the benefits of agricultural recharge while 
minimizing its associated problems. That might mean, for example, trying to 
encourage irrigators to time applications of water so that recharge will 
augment dry-season surface flows.231 Alternatively, it might mean asking 
irrigators who switch to lower-recharge practices to address the associated 
impacts to water uses that have come to depend on the recharge from prior 
practices.232 
But with agricultural use, as with other areas of groundwater-recharge 
law, impacts upon recharge are addressed, if at all, primarily as the incidental 
consequences of laws focused on other matters. Policies that help determine 
where agriculture occurs, for example, generally focus on limiting 
development in prime agricultural areas; promoting groundwater recharge is 
not part of the calculus.233 Similarly, states generally assign water rights 
without considering the effects of surface-water diversions on groundwater-
 
228. See Teri E. Popp, A Survey of Governmental Response to the Farmland Crisis: States’ 
Application of Agricultural Zoning, 11 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 515, 521-34 (1988-1989) 
(describing relationships between farming and zoning powers). 
229. See generally BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D. LESHY, ROBERT H. ABRAMS & SANDRA B. 
ZELLMER, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2018) 
(including dozens of cases involving irrigators). 
230. See, e.g., Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 371-72, 374 (2011) (describing Montana’s 
allegations that increased agricultural-water-use efficiency led to reduced seepage and 
thus to lower Yellowstone River flows). 
231. See, e.g., George Kourakos et al., Increasing Groundwater Availability and Seasonal Base 
Flow Through Agricultural Managed Aquifer Recharge in an Irrigated Basin, 55 WATER 
RES. RSCH. 7464, 7464, 7486-87 (2019) (examining the potential for seasonal recharge in 
California’s Central Valley); Helen E. Dahlke et al., Managed Winter Flooding of Alfalfa 
Recharges Groundwater with Minimal Crop Damage, 72 CAL. AGRIC. 65, 65-66 (2018) 
(proposing managed flooding of agricultural fields as a recharge mechanism). 
232. But see infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text (discussing laws that allow irrigators 
to salvage recharged irrigation water without worrying about impacts on downstream 
or downgradient users). 
233. See, e.g., Prime Farmland and Farmland of Statewide Importance, CAL. DEP’T 
CONSERVATION, https://perma.cc/X3J5-HA5F (archived Apr. 16, 2021) (describing the 
criteria for designating farmland without mentioning the potential to promote aquifer 
recharge). 
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recharge levels.234 Even in places where irrigation-related recharge is highly 
problematic—which can happen where excess recharge raises the water table, 
flooding and often polluting plants’ root zones—regulators do not factor that 
recharge into their assessment of the underlying surface-water right. 
There is one water-rights doctrine that has more direct implications for 
agricultural recharge. In the western United States, the doctrine of recapture 
allows surface-water irrigators to reclaim surface water that recharged 
groundwater.235 In other words, even after irrigation water has leaked through 
irrigation ditches or percolated below plants’ root zones, that water remains 
part of the surface-water right, and the rightsholder can pump it back to the 
surface and reuse it.236 As a closely related corollary to that rule, a surface-
water-right holder also may change to different water-use practices, even if 
that means the quantity of groundwater recharge on her land decreases, and 
even if downgradient or downstream water users or ecosystems have come to 
rely on the recharge generated by the old water-use practices.237 Those human 
users and ecosystems may use the recharge as long as it remains present, but 
they cannot demand its continuation.238 
For a water-rights system, the doctrine of recapture has some important 
advantages. It allows water-right holders to reap the benefits of increased 
water-use efficiency, rather than locking them into practices that generate 
recharge but do so through excess water applications or leaky infrastructure. 
 
234. See, e.g., Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, Guidance to Applicants for New Water Right 
Permits: Instructions for Form No. ECY 040-1-14A (2020), https://perma.cc/QEA3-
J3RG (explaining the required elements for a permit application, which do not include 
a discussion of recharge associated with water use); Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res., 
Application Guidelines: Permit to Appropriate Public Water of the State of Arizona or 
to Construct a Reservoir 7 (2016), https://perma.cc/LC3B-3BJE (requiring a discussion 
of groundwater recharge, but only if the project is specifically designed as a recharge 
project). 
235. See, e.g., Montana, 563 U.S. at 380-81; Barker v. Sonner, 294 P. 1053, 1054 (Or. 1931) (en 
banc) (“[A]n appropriator is justified in recapturing waste water remaining upon his 
land . . . .”). 
236. See, e.g., United States v. Haga, 276 F. 41, 43 (D. Idaho 1921) (stating that the rights of 
surface-water appropriators extend “to what is commonly known as wastage from 
surface run-off and deep percolation”); Bidleman v. Short, 150 P. 834, 836 (Nev. 1915) 
(“So long as such waters exist upon their lands, it is their property . . . .”). 
237. See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Long, 773 P.2d 988, 996-97 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc) (“If the senior 
appropriator, through scientific and technical advances, can utilize his water so that 
none is wasted, no other appropriator can complain.”). 
238. See, e.g., Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist., 90 P.2d 58, 61 (Cal. 1939) (en banc) (per 
curiam) (“It is the general rule, probably subject to exceptions not here involved, that 
the producer of an artificial flow is for the most part under no obligation to lower 
claimants to continue to maintain it.”); Lambeye v. Garcia, 157 P. 977, 978-79 (Ariz. 
1916) (“[W]hile the water so denominated as waste water may be used after it escapes, 
no permanent right can be acquired to have the discharge kept up . . . .”). 
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Relatedly, it facilitates transfers of water to higher-value users; many transfers 
occur because agricultural users adopt more efficient practices and then sell the 
saved water.239 But the doctrine accomplishes these beneficial outcomes at the 
expense of potential reliance interests in groundwater recharge. More 
generally, it continues the theme, which is reflected across many areas of 
water-related law, of treating groundwater recharge as an incidental 
consequence of doctrines and practices focused on other aspects of water 
management. 
D. Managed Aquifer Recharge 
A recurring theme of the discussion so far has been law’s indifference, or 
just glancing attention, to groundwater recharge. But there are management 
practices that take a very different approach, and they come with an emerging 
body of law. Increasingly, water managers are turning to a practice known as 
managed aquifer recharge (MAR) to improve management of water 
supplies.240 
MAR generally involves using empty aquifer space to store water from 
some other source.241 Typically the source is surface water,242 though some 
MAR projects rely on groundwater from other aquifers243 or on treated 
municipal wastewater.244 The project managers typically use discrete 
infrastructure—often infiltration basins or injection wells—to place the water 
in the subsurface.245 Many projects are run by water districts, which develop 
 
239. See PETER W. CULP, ROBERT GLENNON & GARY LIBECAP, HAMILTON PROJECT & STANFORD 
WOODS INST. FOR THE ENV’T, DISCUSSION PAPER 2014-05, SHOPPING FOR WATER: HOW THE 
MARKET CAN MITIGATE WATER SHORTAGES IN THE AMERICAN WEST 7 (2014) (explaining 
how markets can create incentives for increased water-use efficiency). 
240. See generally COMM. ON SUSTAINABLE UNDERGROUND STORAGE OF RECOVERABLE 
WATER, NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 15 (describing MAR 
concepts and projects). 
241. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., supra note 96, at 12 (defining “managed aquifer 
recharge”). 
242. See, e.g., Anita Milman et al., Groundwater Recharge for Water Security: The Arizona Water 
Bank, Arizona, 5 CASE STUD. ENV’T, no. 1, 2021, at 1, 1 (describing how the Arizona 
Water Bank stores water diverted from the Colorado River). 
243. E.g., Aquifer Storage & Recovery, SAN ANTONIO WATER SYS., https://perma.cc/L97F-
PVNQ (last updated Mar. 11, 2021) (describing a program to store excess Edwards 
Aquifer water in another aquifer). 
244. E.g., What Is SWIFT?, HRSD, https://perma.cc/49NE-9UDR (archived Apr. 20, 2021) 
(describing the Hampton Roads Sanitary District’s Sustainable Water Initiative for 
Tomorrow (SWIFT), which uses recharge of treated wastewater to combat saltwater 
intrusion in a coastal Virginia aquifer). 
245. See COMM. ON SUSTAINABLE UNDERGROUND STORAGE OF RECOVERABLE WATER, NAT’L 
RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 15, at 27-29 (describing recharge 
methods); see also, e.g., Recharge and Recovery, KERN WATER BANK AUTH., 
footnote continued on next page 
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the projects primarily or exclusively for their own use,246 but others function 
as shared banks, which multiple participating agencies or third parties may use 
for water deposits and withdrawals.247 Any MAR project requires systems of 
monitoring and accounting as well as physical infrastructure, especially 
because these MAR projects typically use aquifers where other landowners 
hold rights to native groundwater.248 States generally treat the MAR water as 
legally separate from that native groundwater—legally, it is classified as stored 
surface water249—but the physical commingling of the two resources can 
create some accounting challenges and complex legal questions.250 
A full discussion of the variety of MAR projects and the legal frameworks 
needed for their success is a subject for a different article.251 For present 
purposes, two key points should suffice. The first is that MAR projects come in 
a wide variety of forms. Some involve diversion of surface water and 
infiltration at discrete and limited sites, but other projects involve the kinds of 
land-use practices that have been the primary focus of this Article; they have 
used deliberate flooding of agricultural fields,252 removal of invasive 
 
https://perma.cc/9QNZ-5FX5 (archived Mar. 12, 2021) (explaining how water is 
recharged into storage in Kern County, California). 
246. See, e.g., Kathleen Miller et al., An Urban Drought Reserve Enabled by State Groundwater 
Recharge Legislation: The Bear Canyon Recharge Project, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 5 CASE 
STUD. ENV’T, no. 1, 2021, at 1, 1 (describing a project run by a single water district for 
the benefit of a single city). 
247. See, e.g., Michael Kiparsky et al., Groundwater Recharge for a Regional Water Bank: Kern 
Water Bank, Kern County, California, 5 CASE STUD. ENV’T, no. 1, 2021, at 1, 4-9 
(describing the Kern Water Bank, which provides storage capacity to multiple member 
agencies and also allows those agencies to market their stored water); Groundwater 
Banking, SEMITROPIC WATER STORAGE DIST., https://perma.cc/E6V5-TPWU (archived 
Mar. 12, 2021) (describing another southern California groundwater bank). 
248. See William Blomquist et al., Institutions and Conjunctive Water Management Among 
Three Western States, 41 NAT. RES. J. 653, 657-59 (2001) (describing these challenges and 
the advantages of clear rights in stored water). 
249. See GREGORY A. THOMAS, NAT. HERITAGE INST., DESIGNING SUCCESSFUL GROUNDWATER 
BANKING PROGRAMS IN THE CENTRAL VALLEY: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE 21-22 (2001), 
https://perma.cc/UNL7-32AL (describing the legal status of banked water). 
250. See Blomquist et al., supra note 248, at 658-59 (describing these challenges). 
251. I have separated out MAR in large part because MAR law is primarily surface-water law, 
while the focus of this Article is on the intersection of land-use and groundwater law. 
252. See, e.g., Richard G. Niswonger et al., Managed Aquifer Recharge Through Off-Season 
Irrigation in Agricultural Regions, 53 WATER RES. RSCH. 6970, 6971 (2017) (describing 
“Ag-MAR” projects); Helen E. Dahlke et al., Managed Aquifer Recharge as a Tool to 
Enhance Sustainable Groundwater Management in California: Examples from Field and 
Modeling Studies, in ADVANCES IN CHEMICAL POLLUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT AND PROTECTION: ADVANCED TOOLS FOR INTEGRATED WATER 
MANAGEMENT 215, 245-46 (Jan Friesen & Leonor Rodríguez-Sinobas eds., 2018) 
(providing a case study from California’s Kings River Basin). 
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vegetation,253 and recharge of municipal wastewater and stormwater 
runoff.254 In one of the most innovative projects, water managers in 
California’s Pajaro Valley have created a “recharge net metering” system, 
whereby landowners who augment groundwater recharge can obtain 
reductions in their otherwise substantial groundwater pumping fees.255 The 
second point is that many MAR projects are modest in scale, at least compared 
to overall volumes of groundwater storage and use.256 With some notable 
exceptions,257 they typically cover limited areas, and they often are run by a 
single entity or a limited set of participants.258 Because of that modest scale, the 
vast majority of the world’s groundwater recharge occurs outside of MAR 
projects, and most groundwater users cannot take advantage of a MAR 
project.259 Consequently, while the law of MAR projects is complicated and 
likely to be increasingly important, a study of groundwater-recharge law that 
focuses solely on MAR projects would miss much of the action. 
 
253. See, e.g., Nature Conservancy, Case Study: Ventura County; Removing Arundo donax 
to Improve Groundwater Supply and Enhance Habitat (2019), https://perma.cc/9N37-
7ELR (describing an invasive-species-removal program). 
254. E.g., Groundwater Management, ORANGE CNTY. WATER DIST., https://perma.cc/HG48-
QPEA (archived Mar. 12, 2021). 
255. See MICHAEL KIPARSKY ET AL., RECHARGE NET METERING TO ENHANCE GROUNDWATER 
SUSTAINABILITY 2 (2018), https://perma.cc/GPA8-9CW6. 
256. See, e.g., Res. Conservation Dist. of Santa Cruz Cnty. et al., Recharge Net Metering 
(ReNeM) in the Pajaro Valley 2 (2017), https://perma.cc/R47H-8ZQQ (noting the 
program’s goal to “generate ~1000 ac-ft/yr in total of infiltration benefit”); Miller et al., 
supra note 246, at 1 (describing a small project in New Mexico). Water managers often 
estimate that an acre-foot of water can supply up to two households for one year. See Acre 
Foot, WATER EDUC. FOUND., https://perma.cc/DH9D-RJ8K (archived Mar. 12, 2021). 
Using that estimate, 2,000 acre-feet would only be enough to supply a small town. 
257. E.g., Groundwater Banking, supra note 247 (stating that the Semitropic Groundwater 
Storage Bank “[c]an store a total of 1.65 million acre feet—enough water to meet the 
yearly needs of approximately 3.3 million households”). 
258. See, e.g., Aquifer Storage & Recovery, supra note 243 (describing a project managed by a 
single water district); What Is SWIFT?, supra note 244 (same). 
259. One comparison illustrates this disparity. The Kern Water Bank, which is one of 
California’s few large-scale MAR projects, received approximately 2.5 million acre-feet 
of water for recharge between 1995 and 2017, for an annual average of just under 
109,000 acre-feet. See Kiparsky et al., supra note 247, at 4. That is a large amount of 
water, but in the Tulare Lake Basin—the California region in which the Kern Water 
Bank is located—average groundwater use is approximately 6.185 million acre-feet  
per year, according to California Department of Water Resources statistics. See  
California’s Groundwater, MAVEN’S NOTEBOOK, at fig.2-8 (updated Apr. 1, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/WF9B-BNTP (to view statistics, click “California’s groundwater use 
by the numbers”). 
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III. The Future of Groundwater-Recharge Law 
A key point of this Article so far has been that law is largely indifferent to 
groundwater recharge. This Part turns from describing that state of affairs to 
asking whether the status quo is appropriate and how things might be 
different. Those inquiries break down into three sub-questions. First, what 
circumstances would justify a more robust and intentional legal regime for 
groundwater recharge? Second, what ethic should underpin groundwater-
recharge regimes? And third, what legal instruments might more robust 
systems of groundwater-recharge law use? The answers to each question will 
be contextual; the heterogeneity of groundwater hydrology and its human 
influences means that one-size-fits-all regimes have little promise in this 
realm. Nevertheless, the discussion that follows provides a framework for the 
development of more site-specific regimes and, more generally, for more 
functional groundwater-recharge law. 
A. The Circumstances for Groundwater-Recharge Law 
Any effort at developing groundwater-recharge law should begin with a 
threshold question: Is such law worth having at all? Or, to put it somewhat 
more precisely: Is there need for a set of laws targeted at groundwater recharge, 
or is the currently prevalent system, in which groundwater-recharge law 
exists primarily as an incidental consequence of other legal goals, adequate to 
the task at hand? 
Similar questions often arise with natural resources,260 and they are not 
new to the field of groundwater law, but they have arisen more often for 
groundwater pumping than for recharge.261 In 1861, for example, the Ohio 
Supreme Court explained why it was rejecting any common law limitations on 
groundwater extraction: 
Because the existence, origin, movement and course of such waters, and the causes 
which govern and direct their movements, are so secret, occult and concealed . . . an 
attempt to administer any set of legal rules in respect to them would be involved in 
hopeless uncertainty, and would be, therefore, practically impossible.262 
 
260. See, e.g., Jianlin Chen, Optimal Property Rights for Emerging Natural Resources: A Case 
Study on Owning Atmospheric Moisture, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 47 (2016); Alan J. 
Alexander, Note, The Texas Wind Estate: Wind as a Natural Resource and a Severable 
Property Interest, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 429 (2011); Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. 
L. REV. 1217 (2009). 
261. For a case exemplifying this absence of regulation, see Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150, 
152-54 (Me. 1999) (declining to abandon the absolute-dominion rule, which allows 
unregulated and unlimited groundwater pumping). 
262. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861), overruled by Cline v. Am. Aggregates 
Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ohio 1984). 
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Much of the law of groundwater extraction derives from scientists’ and then 
lawmakers’ increasing rejection of these beliefs.263 But for groundwater 
recharge, with all its complexities and uncertainties, the challenges of 
administration can still be substantial. 
A classic theoretical framework for answering the questions posed above 
comes from the work of economist Harold Demsetz.264 He posited that 
property-rights regimes emerge when the costs of an open-access regime begin 
to exceed the costs of dividing the resource between holders of defined 
rights.265 So, for example, when scarcity makes a previously abundant resource 
more valuable, resource users may decide that the process of defining rights in 
the resource is worth the associated transaction costs.266 Subsequent theorists 
have critiqued, expanded upon, and refined this theory.267 Some expanders 
have pointed out that the theory might explain the emergence of a variety of 
governance regimes, not just systems of property rights.268 Meanwhile, critics 
have pointed out that the theory may do better as a normative account 
explaining when governance regimes ought to emerge than as a descriptive 
account explaining when they actually will.269 Politics, they argue, can play 
more of a causal role than aggregate economic utility.270 But as a commonsense 
metric for judging when groundwater-recharge governance would be helpful, 
Demsetz’s focus on transaction costs and externalities still works reasonably 
 
263. See Owen, supra note 7, at 266-71, 268 n.102, 269 nn.111-12 (describing groundwater-
pumping laws’ uneven evolution toward heightened regulation); Marion Rice 
Kirkwood, Appropriation of Percolating Water, 1 STAN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1948) (describing 
the emergence of statutory regimes for the management of groundwater pumping). 
264. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, AM. ECON. REV., May 1967, at 347; 
see also Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property 
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S331 (2002). 
265. See Demsetz, supra note 264, at 350 (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize 
externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of 
internalization.”). 
266. See id. at 351-53 (discussing the emergence of property rights in furs). 
267. See generally Merrill, supra note 264, at S333-35 (describing some of that literature). 
268. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property 
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S464 (2002). 
269. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S421, S429 (2002) (arguing that interest-group politics also provides a plausible 
origin story for property rights); see also James E. Krier, Essay, Evolutionary Theory and 
the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 143 (2009) (“Even if Toward a 
Theory of Property Rights has little if any theory about the evolution of property rights, 
it can be used to illuminate the subject.”). 
270. See Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359, S360-61, 
S370-71 (2002) (noting that societies may just “reallocate property rights when some 
exogenous political realignment enables a powerful group to grab a larger share of the 
pie” and providing theories about how this might happen). 
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well. The key question, then, is whether the benefits of creating that regime 
will outweigh the associated burdens. 
Sometimes the answer to this question will be no. There are places—rural 
Maine, for example—where groundwater is so abundant that there is no need 
for the government to regulate the quantity of recharge.271 Conversely, in 
some deserts, groundwater scarcity is a problem, but there is essentially no 
recharge to manage.272 
Even where scarcity is present, the costs of legal intervention will still 
sometimes outweigh the benefits. There are two primary reasons why. First, 
any effective groundwater-recharge regime is likely to require information 
about the amounts and locations of groundwater recharge, and that 
information may be difficult to obtain.273 Regulators might compensate for 
that difficulty by using workable generalizations—perhaps grounded in 
simulation models—rather than site-specific data.274 But reaching even those 
workable generalizations takes effort, and individual landowners are likely to 
object whenever the generalizations arguably do not apply.275 Second, even 
where scarcity exists and there is enough information to support a legal 
regime, lawmakers might reasonably worry about the negative externalities 
associated with regulation. If, for example, laws designed to enhance 
groundwater recharge would encourage otherwise problematic practices, like 
 
271. See, e.g., Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150, 152, 154 (Me. 1999) (noting an absence of 
evidence that the “absolute dominion rule,” which rejects any property-rights 
limitation on groundwater pumping, has been flawed in Maine). 
272. See, e.g., Mojave Groundwater Resources, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://perma.cc/9YDA-
MGVD (archived Mar. 12, 2021) (“Recharge to the groundwater system from direct 
infiltration of precipitation is minimal.”). 
273. See LAUREN EVERETT, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., GROUNDWATER RECHARGE 
AND FLOW: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES FOR MONITORING AND MODELING USING 
REMOTELY SENSED DATA 1-2 (2019), https://perma.cc/LGG7-85F6 (describing the 
importance and complexities of groundwater data). 
274. See generally Ajay Singh, Groundwater Resources Management Through the Applications of 
Simulation Modeling: A Review, SCI. TOTAL ENV’T, Nov. 15, 2014, at 415 (describing the 
evolution and types of groundwater models). On the advantages and disadvantages of 
regulating through proxy measures and simulation models, see generally Robert L. 
Glicksman, Bridging Data Gaps Through Modeling and Evaluation of Surrogates: Use of the 
Best Available Science to Protect Biological Diversity Under the National Forest Management 
Act, 83 IND. L.J. 465 (2008); and James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: 
Conflicts Between Models and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 
HASTINGS L.J. 901 (2005) (describing challenges with air-quality modeling). 
275. I have heard modelers lament this tendency to focus on “my favorite pixel”; they worry 
that people are holding models to a false standard of perfection. But one can understand 
why people might judge a model based on its specific application to places they know—
or own. 
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increasing surface-water diversions or accelerating harvests of forests, a 
laissez-faire regime may be the better choice.276 
Nevertheless, there are likely to be many places where the informational 
challenges of developing a legal regime are worth confronting. Southern 
California provides a classic example. The region’s water-supply challenges are 
famous, but heavy storms do hit southern California, particularly in its 
mountainous areas, and those storms create surges of surface flow that 
recharge the region’s large aquifers.277 The extent to which that recharge 
happens will depend upon vegetation management in the mountains and on 
urban development; it is sensitive to human intervention.278 In such a place, 
the scarcity that favors legal governance of recharge clearly does exist. 
Additionally, the data challenges that might undermine regulatory 
interventions are diminishing,279 or at least could diminish if political will is 
present. Groundwater monitoring and modeling are evolving sciences, and 
remote-sensing technologies now allow levels of precision and accuracy that 
were unthinkable a generation or two ago.280 Additionally, many 
groundwater-data gaps reflect political choices rather than scientific 
challenges. The frequent unavailability of pumping data is one obvious 
example.281 One challenge for a groundwater-recharge regime would likely be 
the absence of such data; it is hard to determine the effectiveness of recharge 
 
276. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (noting that permanently removing forests 
might be effective for enhancing groundwater recharge and problematic for many 
other reasons). Prohibitions on this sort of action could be included in the legal regime, 
of course, and they might be effective. But they also could make the legal regime more 
complicated, which might diminish its value. 
277. See, e.g., Mojave Groundwater Resources, supra note 272 (noting that aquifers in the 
Mojave Desert receive recharge from ephemeral surface-water flows out of the 
surrounding mountains); GREGORY C. LINES, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., WATER-
RESOURCES INVESTIGATIONS REP. NO. 95-4189, GROUND-WATER AND SURFACE-WATER 
RELATIONS ALONG THE MOJAVE RIVER, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 41 (1996), 
https://perma.cc/7QXK-PBNT (“The flood-plain aquifer receives virtually all of its 
recharge from the river, and most of the water originates in the headwaters.”); see also 
Jobbágy et al., supra note 44, at 679 (“More-distant sources of recharge are particularly 
significant in arid regions located downstream of water-yielding mountains.”); Scanlon 
et al., supra note 38, at 3345-46 (finding that recharge in the American Southwest often 
occurs in mountains or at mountain fronts). 
278. See Kinoshita & Hogue, supra note 71, at 5-6 (finding a relationship between fires and 
water flows); NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL & PAC. INST., NO. 14-05-G, STORMWATER CAPTURE 
POTENTIAL IN URBAN AND SUBURBAN CALIFORNIA 6 (2014), https://perma.cc/Q5AY-S9XF. 
279. See EVERETT, supra note 273, at 3-6 (describing older and emerging technologies). 
280. See generally id. (describing the capabilities but also the limitations of emerging 
technologies). 
281. See François Molle et al., The Local and National Politics of Groundwater Overexploitation, 
11 WATER ALTERNATIVES 445, 450 (2018) (providing examples of United States regions 
and other countries where groundwater pumping is poorly managed and monitored). 
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practices without knowing how much water is stored within an aquifer and 
how much is coming out. And those data are often missing not because of some 
technological limitation—well meters have existed for a long time—but 
because many groundwater users prefer to have their pumping remain 
unmonitored and because lawmakers have acquiesced to that preference.282 
Similarly, while externalities or offsetting effects might make regulatory 
intervention inappropriate in some places, there are other places where 
regulation ought to create win-win scenarios. For one example, consider a 
coastal urban area where groundwater is an important water-supply source, 
interrupted recharge is contributing to declining water tables (and surface-
water flooding), and those declining water levels are causing land subsidence, 
seawater intrusion, and the potential loss of the area’s water supply. In such a 
place, groundwater-recharge regulation could be crucial to the city’s survival. 
Worldwide, millions of people live in places, like Houston or Jakarta, that fit 
that description.283 
Cape Town, South Africa, exemplifies another type of circumstance in 
which groundwater-recharge law could be crucially important. In 2018, the 
city nearly ran out of water.284 The crisis arose partly because non-native 
vegetation had increased transpiration levels and decreased recharge 
throughout much of the watershed that supplies the city.285 In such a location, 
developing a legal structure for recharge management is exceedingly 
important. And Cape Town is not the only place where legal interventions 
targeted at vegetation management could be valuable. In the western United 
States, recharge-promoting policies also might mesh well with reformed fire-
management strategies, leaving many areas with more water, healthier 
ecosystems, and less risk of catastrophic fire.286 
These examples illustrate a broader point. In a world where groundwater 
is crucially important and frequently over-tapped, and where populations are 
 
282. See EVERETT, supra note 273, at 3 (“In many cases, political restrictions exacerbate [data 
gaps]; wells may be monitored, but the data are not made available.”). 
283. See Amanda Ruggeri, The Ambitious Plan to Stop the Ground from Sinking, BBC: FUTURE 
(Dec. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZQ7V-GQGX (describing subsidence problems around 
the world—and the use of recharge programs as a partial response). For a general 
description of the challenges of coastal-aquifer management, see generally Holly A. 
Michael et al., Science, Society, and the Coastal Groundwater Squeeze, 53 WATER RES. RSCH. 
2610 (2017). 
284. See NATURE CONSERVANCY & WATER FUNDS FOR AFR., supra note 69, at 11 (noting that 
Cape Town narrowly escaped “Day Zero,” when taps stop running). 
285. See id. at 20-21, 28 (estimating water-yield losses caused by invasive species at 55 billion 
liters per year). 
286. See generally Boisramé et al., supra note 214 (describing the advantages of a more natural 
fire regime). 
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growing and the climate is changing, there will be places where people cannot 
afford not to have groundwater-recharge law. 
B. A Groundwater-Recharge Ethic 
In Frazier v. Brown,287 the decision that accorded groundwater movements 
“occult” status, the Ohio Supreme Court did not rest its rule of nonregulation 
solely on scientific uncertainty. Instead, and somewhat less colorfully, it also 
warned that groundwater-use regulation would inappropriately interfere with 
economic development.288 That claim underscores the importance of a second 
key question for groundwater-recharge law: What sort of ethic should 
underpin such laws? The question in turn incorporates two somewhat 
overlapping questions. First, what sort of ethical relationship between 
different groups of people should be embodied in groundwater-recharge law? 
Second, what sort of environmental ethic should that law contain? 
Answers to these questions already are embedded, largely implicitly, in the 
laws—and legal gaps—that touch on groundwater recharge. Like the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Frazier, those answers generally reflect a laissez-faire 
ethic favoring landowners’ discretion rather than the protection of water rights 
and natural systems. The implicit ethic embedded in the common-enemy rule, 
for example, favors governmental nonintervention—not just from regulatory 
agencies but also from courts—in the actions of landowners.289 By denying 
downhill or downstream landowners any claim against their neighbors’ surface-
water management, the common-enemy rule effectively says that upstream 
landowners can do as they will and downstream landowners (and water-right 
holders) will respond as they must.290 That same ethic is implicit in most existing 
groundwater-recharge laws’ treatment of the natural environment. By 
establishing almost no requirements for maintaining or enhancing recharge that 
provides environmental benefits—and by providing no rewards for landowners 
who do create such benefits—groundwater-recharge law suggests that a 
landowner’s autonomy to manage his or her own land counts more than affected 
natural systems or maintenance of the collective benefits of shared aquifers.291 
 
287. 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861), overruled by Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324, 327 
(Ohio 1984). 
288. Id. at 311. 
289. See supra notes 109-18 and accompanying text. 
290. See, e.g., Morrison v. Bucksport & Bangor R.R. Co., 67 Me. 353, 355-56 (1877) (“[A]ny 
proprietor of land may control the flow of mere surface water over his own premises, 
according to his own wants and interests, without obligation to any proprietor either 
above or below. . . . If all this were not so, men could not reconstruct and utilize their 
landed estates without infinite trouble and suits.”). 
291. See supra Parts II.B-.C.1 (discussing how groundwater-recharge benefits are essentially 
irrelevant to laws governing forests and floodplains). 
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Interestingly, groundwater-recharge law largely maintains that ethic even when 
it operates to the detriment of other property-rights holders. A water-right 
holder generally has no claim against a landowner who changes cropping 
patterns in ways that limit recharge, for example, or who eliminates leakage 
upon which the rightsholder had come to rely.292 
Other ethical frameworks are possible. As a modest adjustment, 
groundwater-recharge law could favor different types of property owners; it 
might prioritize the interests of landowners who are impacted by changed 
runoff patterns rather than those who create the impacts. Or, alternatively, 
groundwater-recharge law might prioritize previously established water-use 
rights over landowners’ discretion to manage land surfaces.293 Both of these 
changes would reflect an underlying preference for maintaining some form of 
the status quo, or for protecting earlier-established rights, rather than for 
promoting landowners’ discretion to change their land uses as they see fit. 
Groundwater-recharge law also could favor more of a communitarian or 
environmentalist ethic. Rather than simply trying to favor one class of private 
property owners, or to minimize governmental involvement, groundwater-
recharge law could treat maintenance of shared aquifers—and the surface 
waterways that aquifers support—as a collective responsibility.294 Some areas 
of groundwater-recharge law do reflect such an ethic. Stormwater-
management fees, for example, reflect an implicit judgment that stormwater-
management is a collective good, the protection of which leads to 
individualized obligations.295 But within the limited and inchoate field of 
groundwater-recharge law, that is a relatively rare approach. 
More widespread adoption of a communitarian environmental ethic would 
make sense. On utilitarian grounds, it holds clear value—at least in situations 
where groundwater is scarce and regulators could track recharge effectively 
enough to administer a legal regime. Laissez-faire regimes for groundwater 
recharge allow all kinds of externalities, some positive but many negative, and 
provide no mechanism for compelling internalization of those costs. The likely 
result is a series of decisions that make sense for individual landowners but not 
 
292. See Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 380-81 (2011) (explaining the rule of recapture). 
293. Many western states have already made this shift for groundwater and surface-water 
rights. Where groundwater users once could pump without worrying about impacts 
on surface water, both types of rights are now part of the same regulatory system, with 
groundwater rights often subordinated because of their later origin. See, e.g., Blomquist 
et al., supra note 248, at 674 (describing Colorado’s system). 
294. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Essay, Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENV’T L. 27, 36-38 
(1996) (arguing that water ethics should recognize and embrace humans’ roles in 
natural and human communities). 
295. For a general description of stormwater utilities, see Brisman, supra note 125. 
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for collective welfare.296 An individual landowner, for example, might benefit if 
levees isolate his land from a river’s floodplain and thus limit recharge on that 
land, but that kind of decision may deprive the river of important dry-season 
flows while also increasing flood risk, and the landowner has no reason to worry 
about those costs.297 They literally can just be shifted downstream. Likewise, 
individual decisions to develop land without regard to stormwater recharge may 
make sense for the developers, but the collective consequences may be urban 
flooding, the loss of important groundwater supplies, and the need for expensive 
stormwater-management infrastructure.298 
Nonutilitarian ethical theories lead—mostly—in similar directions. Any 
ethic that values sustainability or functioning environmental systems carries the 
corollary necessity of recognizing individual responsibility to maintain and 
contribute to recharge. If, to quote the famous naturalist Aldo Leopold, “[a] thing 
is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community,” then preserving groundwater recharge, and thus the streams and 
wetlands it sustains, is often the right thing to do.299 Similarly, if ensuring 
fairness and combatting social subordination is a key goal, then regulating 
recharge-limiting activities—which often will be carried out by developers, 
government agencies, major landowners, or other powerful actors, and will 
often operate to the detriment of widely needed water supplies—again will often 
make sense. Even if one leaves redistribution and environmental values to the 
side, adopts a purely anthropocentric ethic, and argues that the primary goal of a 
legal regime should be to protect property rights, the current nonregulatory 
approach holds little justification. Practices that affect groundwater recharge 
routinely affect, often adversely, other people’s rights in water and land, and 
nonregulation amounts to valuing one set of property rights over other sets of 
property rights, often without any justification other than inertia. Only if 
governmental nonintervention is at the core of the ethical theory, rather than 
serving as a means to accomplish some other goal, does treating groundwater 
recharge as a subject unfit for legal governance make any sense. 
Nevertheless, even if it makes sense to acknowledge collective 
responsibility for groundwater-recharge protection, that raises a secondary 
question. How far should individual landowners’ obligations to provide 
collective benefits go? If a landowner is to be penalized for inhibiting recharge 
 
296. See Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to 
Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 558-59 (1993) (explaining this classic account of how 
externalities lead to suboptimal decisionmaking). 
297. See supra notes 170-80 and accompanying text (describing how levees limit 
groundwater recharge). 
298. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. 
299. ALDO LEOPOLD, The Land Ethic, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, WITH OTHER ESSAYS ON 
CONSERVATION FROM ROUND RIVER 237, 240 (2d prtg. 1969). 
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or rewarded for creating it, whoever is calculating the penalty or benefit must 
ask, “compared to what?”300 In other words, the law must select some level of 
recharge (or permissible range of levels) that would be appropriate for that 
parcel and then must compare the actual level of recharge to that baseline level. 
Selecting those baselines can be tricky. Setting a baseline requires navigating 
thorny questions about ethics and feasibility as well as developing precise 
measures, neither of which is easy.301 Imagine, for example, a land-use change 
that increases recharge on property that has been used for timber production 
for decades, and imagine also that the level of recharge on that property has 
been less under timber production than it would have been under natural 
conditions. Is the landowner entitled to claim a benefit because she has 
increased recharge relative to preexisting conditions, or should she pay a 
penalty because she has reduced recharge relative to natural conditions? There 
are potential fairness and efficiency arguments in favor of either course, and 
the answer isn’t obvious. Yet for a recharge regime to be functional, a baseline 
is indispensable. 
I would not suggest any universal answer to this question. Indeed, similar 
questions recur throughout environmental and natural-resource law—they 
come up, for example, any time lawmakers erect a cap-and-trade regime for 
greenhouse gases or other pollutants—and legal systems’ answers are all over 
the map.302 Nevertheless, several factors might inform a legal regime’s 
approach to selecting baselines. First, lawmakers ought to consider the social 
utility of the activity causing the recharge impact. If that activity is otherwise 
highly valuable, then some relaxing of recharge obligations might be 
appropriate.303 Second, historic practices and reliance interests ought to 
matter;304 lawmakers might reasonably impose different recharge obligations 
on a proposed new activity in a floodplain than on a community that has 
occupied that floodplain for decades. Third, and perhaps most importantly, 
 
300. For a general discussion of the challenge of setting analytical baselines, see J.B. Ruhl & 
James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the 
Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
301. See id. at 13-15 (discussing the challenges of choosing between “ancient” and “recent” 
baselines). 
302. See Dave Owen, Auctions, Taxes, and Air, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 64, 70-71 (2017). See 
generally Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 
91 (2011) (exploring multiple approaches to the challenge of allocating the burdens of 
new regulatory instruments). 
303. An example might be recharge impacts resulting from the restoration of degraded 
forest landscapes. See Elliott et al., supra note 191, at 987, 991-92 (describing the 
increasing water demand of a regenerating forest). 
304. See, e.g., Ann M. Eisenberg, Just Transitions, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 273, 275-85 (2019) 
(describing the argument for assistance, in the context of decarbonization, to people 
who have depended on the old legal regime). 
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ethics often must give way to politics.305 If the only way to get a groundwater-
recharge regime in place is to minimize burdens upon existing landowners, 
that may be preferable to having no regime at all.306 But fourth, and finally, the 
presently prevalent approach, in which landowners can be asked to depart 
from present conditions only if someone pays, has thin ethical justifications. 
Those present conditions were not divinely ordained; instead, they often 
reflect human-constructed legal regimes that allowed some property owners to 
exploit collectively shared resources to the detriment of the rest of the public. 
Continuing those practices need not and should not be a given. 
C. The Instruments of Groundwater-Recharge Law 
Even where groundwater-recharge law seems possible and normatively 
justified, a third key question remains: How should it be done? Other existing 
laws provide a wide variety of potential models,307 and this Subpart explores 
which techniques would make sense. Again, it offers no single 
recommendation; instrument choice instead should depend on the nature of 
the goals of regulatory interventions, the nature of the practices being 
regulated, and the actors involved. Nevertheless, this section does offer an 
argument for the selective use of financial-incentive systems—like stormwater 
utilities—that use impact fees to encourage more effective recharge 
management.308 
For groundwater-recharge law, the range of potential instruments is large. 
Changes to property and tort doctrines might be one place to start; one could 
eliminate the common-enemy rule or limit the ability of landowners to change 
land-use practices and recover previously recharged water, and then leave 
implementation to private litigation before judges. Many environmental law 
regimes rely on evaluation and disclosure requirements, and such requirements 
might lead to modest improvements in groundwater-recharge management.309 
The Forest Service, for example, might establish more explicit and demanding 
requirements for factoring groundwater recharge into forest-management 
 
305. See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 300, at 2-4 (noting the political origins of “no net 
loss” policies for wetlands). 
306. The political challenges of achieving groundwater-pumping regulation, even in places 
where it appears to be badly needed, counsel that these difficulties may be large. See, e.g., 
Leahy, supra note 22, at 39 (describing the long and difficult process of moving toward 
statewide groundwater-use regulation in California). 
307. For an accessible summary and classification of regulatory instruments, see James 
Salzman, Teaching Supplement, Teaching Policy Instrument Choice in Environmental Law: 
The Five P’s, 23 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 363, 363-64 (2013). 
308. See generally Brisman, supra note 125 (describing stormwater utilities). 
309. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (requiring environmental-impact statements for “major 
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment”). 
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planning and environmental-impact studies.310 Environmental and natural-
resource laws also often establish best-management-practice requirements or 
restrict problematic activities, and such prescriptive regulation also can (and 
sometimes does) play a part in groundwater-recharge management.311 So, for 
example, state and local land-use regulators might require developers to build 
projects that will recharge most stormwater on-site312 or might restrict 
particularly recharge-limiting agricultural practices.313 
Each of these traditional approaches is likely to make sense in some 
circumstances, and sometimes in combination. Information requirements, for 
example, might be an effective mechanism for gently and gradually pushing 
federal land managers to take recharge management into account.314 Likewise, 
best-management-practice requirements often make sense if regulators generally 
understand that a practice—perhaps using pervious pavement for new 
construction, for example—is effective at enhancing recharge, but those 
regulators lack the resources to establish and then monitor compliance with site-
specific performance standards.315 But one particular regulatory instrument holds 
special promise in this realm. That mechanism uses impact fees to deter negative 
impacts on recharge and to create an aggregated pool of funding, which then can 
support collective efforts at further recharge protection or management. 
This basic model already exists in the realm of groundwater-recharge 
management (and in some other areas of environmental regulation, for it is a 
close cousin to Pigovian taxation316), and municipal stormwater utilities are 
 
310. See Martin Nie & Michael Fiebig, Managing the National Forests Through Place-Based 
Legislation, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 5, 11-13 (2010) (explaining the planning framework of 
national forest-management laws, as well as the flexibility that this framework allows). 
311. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2)(A) (requiring the development of best management practices 
for managing nonpoint-source pollution). See generally Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The 
Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative 
State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133 (2014) (describing a wide variety of permit programs). 
312. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
313. See Vira et al., supra note 222, at 121, 135 (describing South Africa’s permitting 
requirements for tree plantations). 
314. In theory, this could happen under existing law, and perhaps some environmental 
studies do address recharge in thoughtful and useful ways. But I could not find any 
cases in which the U.S. Forest Service’s consideration of recharge impacts was a 
litigated issue. 
315. For evaluation and discussion of a range of best-management practices for urban 
stormwater, see generally U.S. EPA, EPA-821-R-99-012, PRELIMINARY DATA SUMMARY 
OF URBAN STORM WATER BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (1999), https://perma.cc/
B8MV-ZJEX. 
316. See Scharff, supra note 126, at 195-209 (providing a definition of Pigovian tax and 
comparing Pigovian taxes and Pigovian fees). 
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the clearest example of this approach.317 A typical stormwater utility collects 
fees from landowners in its service area.318 The amount of the fee depends on 
the amount of impervious cover on the landowner’s property, with potential 
fee offsets if the landowner installs stormwater-infiltrating features that 
counteract the impacts of that impervious cover.319 The funds produced by the 
fees support maintenance of existing stormwater infrastructure, but they can 
also support projects that reduce runoff and enhance recharge, and municipal 
stormwater managers can select the projects that they think will produce the 
highest-value return at the lowest cost.320 
This regulatory model has several key advantages. First, it addresses the 
common regulatory challenge of dealing with collectively significant problems 
that arise from actions that seem individually insignificant.321 Those problems 
are often quite difficult to address, partly because individual actors do not 
understand the connections between their small actions and the larger problem 
that results and also because regulating the behavior of many small actors can 
create major coordination challenges.322 The stormwater-utility model 
navigates those challenges by asking each actor to make a contribution—often a 
fairly modest one—to a collective and coordinated response.323 Second, this 
model offers fairness. It requires everyone who contributes to a water-
management challenge to contribute to the response, but it tailors the degree of 
obligation to each individual landowner’s degree of contribution.324 Third, this 
regulatory model preserves flexibility. A facility that really needs its impervious 
surfaces still can have them; it just has to pay larger impact fees. 
 
317. See id. at 205-06. See generally Brisman, supra note 125 (providing a general discussion of 
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REV. 1385, 1386-89 (2011) (describing the prevalence of large problems arising from 
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2021) (arguing that a stormwater charge is a more equitable way of allocating the 
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A key question, then, is whether and how this type of model might be 
deployed to address other recharge-management challenges. Floodplains 
provide one potential opportunity. If landowners in levee-protected floodplain 
areas were charged groundwater-recharge impact fees, the fees might create an 
additional deterrent to floodplain construction, and authorities might then use 
those fees for selective buyouts of flood-prone areas, perhaps allowing them to 
become recharge zones again. Similarly, in areas where new timber-
management or cropping patterns will diminish recharge, regulators might 
again impose impact fees, which they might use to support recharge-enhancing 
practices elsewhere in the watershed. The model also can use payments rather 
than fees.325 Suppose, for example, that a city’s water supply depends on 
forested lands traditionally managed for timber harvesting and recreation. 
That city could develop a groundwater-recharge fund, which would pay 
landowners for prescribed burning, invasive-species removal, or other 
recharge-promoting activities, with the understanding that the city will then 
hold rights to the resulting enhanced flows.326 
These types of fee- or payment-based models will not make sense in all 
circumstances. Like any effort to commodify the value of land-use changes, 
they will require reasonably accurate accounting methods, lest users wind up 
paying for or receiving credit for recharge that the land-use changes never 
actually produce.327 That reasonably accurate information isn’t always 
available.328 Fee- or payment-based models also do not avoid difficult questions 
about ethics and fairness. Deciding who should pay or be paid, and how much, 
requires thinking through difficult questions about the extent to which people 
are entitled to alter land even when those alterations adversely affect the 
interests of others.329 Our systems of property and regulatory law generally 
reject both “as much as you want” and “not at all” as answers to that question, 
 
325. See Carolyn Kousky & Sarah E. Light, Insuring Nature, 69 DUKE L.J. 323, 347-50 (2019) 
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but there are many possible points on the spectrum in between330—and, as the 
previous Subpart discussed, many plausible ways of setting the baseline.331 
Finally, just because fees make sense in both economic and fairness terms does 
not always make them politically palatable. People often don’t understand 
what the fee is paying for, and even when they do, opposition to fee-based 
regulatory systems can be intense.332 
Nevertheless, the fact that fee-based models will be impractical in some places 
and unpalatable in others should not detract attention from their possibilities. No 
regulatory model is perfect, and most regulation—even badly needed regulation—
can be unpopular. In places where improved groundwater recharge requires some 
legal intervention, they offer a particularly promising approach. 
Conclusion 
Climate is always variable, but recent years have brought particularly 
dramatic fluctuations—and also harbingers of the future—to the United States. 
Droughts have battered much of the American West, but interspersed between 
those drought years have been some of the wettest winters on record. 
Groundwater storage is crucially important for mitigating the effects of these 
extremes. But much of the West, and indeed much of the world, has given little 
attention to the laws that affect water’s pathways into aquifers. And many of 
the legal regimes that incidentally impact groundwater recharge are 
counterproductive. 
This Article has argued for more intentional laws governing groundwater 
recharge. Those laws will not be needed everywhere, nor will they be easy to 
design or implement. Challenges of information, coordination, ethics, and 
instrument design will be significant, and the politics of any new body of 
regulatory law can be difficult. But similar challenges arise, and have been at 
least partially surmounted, in many other fields of environmental and natural-
resource law. The severity of our coming water-management challenges will 
require similar efforts for groundwater recharge. 
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